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Breaking Through the Courtroom Door: Reexamining the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s Public Education Finance Cases 
 
By Nicholas Infusino 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“We cannot close our eyes to the perceptional and exceptional child; the mentally or physically 
handicapped or the gifted; the underprivileged; the oppressed.  No, we have realized on our 
committee—and we hope that you will realize—that they, too, are human beings with the same 
rights as everyone else.  We, the people, the state, society can no longer hide from the fact that 
thousands and thousands and thousands of youngsters in our community are not being developed 
to the fullest of their capacity.”1 
 
Illinois public schools have faced significant fiscal challenges for decades.
2
  Following 
the 2008 recession, however, these challenges have escalated into a full-blown crisis, exacerbated 
by unpaid state government debts and new levels of fiscal austerity.
3
  During the 2011-12 school 
year, just 32.5% of public school funding came from the state, a share lower than almost all other 
states in the U.S.
4
  This is despite the fact that in recent years Illinois has spent less on education, 
as a share of the state gross domestic product, than thirty-two other states.
5
    
                                                        
 Loyola University Chicago School of Law, May 2013. Many thanks to my parents Jim and Gaby and siblings Katie and Alex for 
their constant love, encouragement, and humor. Thanks also to the Children’s Legal Rights Journal’s staff, who have been 
tremendously helpful during the editing process of this article. 
1
 1 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 764 (1970) [hereinafter RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS] 
(remarks by Delegate Samuel Patch). 
2 See Bob Secter, Reliance on Local Money Drives School Funding Imbalances, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-school-funding-20100330,0,5052098.story (noting that, due to legislative inertia 
and factional politics, “Illinois schools have lurched from financial crisis to financial crisis” without enacting any substantial funding 
reforms); see also JANE GALLOWAY BURESH, A FUNDAMENTAL GOAL: EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS 74 (1975) (noting 
that at the time of the last Illinois constitutional convention in 1970, Illinois had worked “for decades” in an attempt to overcome 
inequalities in educational spending). 
3 In 2011, for example, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed into law a state budget that cut $171 million in funding for public schools. 
Monique Garcia & Ray Long, Quinn Signs State Budget Hours Before Deadline, CHI. TRIB. (Jun. 30, 2011), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/clout/chi-quinn-signs-state-budget-hours-before-deadline-20110630,0,6257424.story. 
Most of the cuts—$152.2 million—came from the general state aid provided to all districts based on student enrollment numbers. See 
Tara Malone & Ray Long, Budget Would Cut $171 Million from Public Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Jun. 1, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-01/news/ct-met-budget-education-20110601_1_early-childhood-education-school-districts-
state-budget-plan. Because the statutory minimum amount of per-pupil funding remained the same, the cut forced local districts to pay 
a greater share of overall school funding. Id. Governor Quinn again proposed severe cuts to education funding in the most recent 
budget—more than $300 million—but the General Assembly ultimately defeated the proposal. See Monique Garcia & Rick Pearson, 
Democrats Forge $35 Billion State Budget, CHI. TRIB. (May 29, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-29/news/ct-met-
illinois-budget-0529-20130529_1_state-budget-house-gop-state-worker; see also Diane Rado & Andy Grimm, Quinn’s Proposed 
Budget Squeezes Educators, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-08/news/ct-met-school-cuts-
20130308_1_state-aid-school-districts-class-sizes. Making the problem even worse, however, is the fact that the state continues to 
simply not pay school districts the funding owed to them. See Malone & Long, supra. Illinois owed schools an astonishing $981 
million during the 2011-2012 school year. Id. In 2013, the state owed districts $634 million in past state aid payments. Rado & 
Grimm, supra. 
4 Local funds derived from property taxes accounted for 55.0% of funds, and 12.5% came from federal monies. ILL. STATE BD. OF 
EDUC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.isbe.state.il.us/reports/annual12/report.pdf; see Total Revenues and Percentage Distribution for Public Elementary and 
Secondary Schools, by Revenue Source and State: School Year 2007-08, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/expenditures/tables.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Total Revenues and Percentage 
Distribution] (providing funding data for all fifty states). 
5 BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 26-27 (2010), 
http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card.pdf. See generally STATE OF ILL., ILLINOIS STATE BUDGET: FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 6-263 – 6-295 (2013), available at 
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Instead, Illinois school districts are primarily funded through local property tax 
revenues.
6
  Because property wealth varies significantly across the state, such a funding scheme 
produces great disparities in how much money school districts are able to spend on their 
students.
7
  To illustrate, Northbrook School District 28, located in the affluent Chicago suburb of 
Northbrook, was able to spend $11,332 on each of its elementary school students during the 
2011-12 school year.
8
  Conversely, Calumet Public School District 132, serving blue-collar 
Calumet City, was able to spend just $5,007 per student in the same year.
9
  While many other 
states employ similar school finance systems, and also often face funding disparities between 
districts,
10 
 Illinois’ heavy reliance on property tax-based funding produces especially profound 
economic inequality between school districts.
11
  In turn, this creates broad disparities in teaching 
quality,
12
 school infrastructure,
13
 and ultimately, the academic achievement of wealthy versus 
poor districts.
14
   
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www2.illinois.gov/gov/budget/Documents/Budget%20Book/FY%202014/FY2014IllinoisOperatingBudgetBook.pdf (providing 
a detailed summary of the most recent proposed Illinois state budget). 
6 See 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2, 5. 
7 See Secter, supra note 2 (“[T]he sharp divide between state and local resources means that schools in towns with pricier homes or 
big shopping centers, factories or thriving commercial centers simply have far more to spend than schools in communities with 
housing and job markets that are chronically wheezing.”). See generally BAKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 10-12 (analyzing disparities in 
education spending across the U.S.). 
8 ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, http://iirc.niu.edu/ (last updated Oct. 25, 2013) [hereinafter ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE REPORT 
CARD]. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s most recent American Community Survey, Northbrook has a median household 
income of $110,902. Selected Economic Characteristics: 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Northbrook 
Village, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU AM. FACTFINDER, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/11_5YR/DP03/1600000US1753481 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). According to the 
same survey, the median household income for the entire state of Illinois is $56,576. Selected Economic Characteristics: 2007-2011 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. FACTFINDER, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/11_5YR/DP03/0400000US17 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
9  ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, supra note 8. Calumet City’s median household income is $41,978. Selected Economic 
Characteristics: 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Calumet City, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. 
FACTFINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/11_5YR/DP03/1600000US1710487 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). At 
the high school level, wealthy Lake Forest CHSD 115 in Lake Forest (median household income of $133,264) was able to spend just 
over $12,000 per student, while J. Sterling Morton High School District 201 in Cicero (median household income of $45,101) spent 
just $6,901. ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, supra note 8; Selected Economic Characteristics: 2007-2011 American 
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Lake Forest, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. FACTFINDER, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/11_5YR/DP03/1600000US1741105 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013); Selected 
Economic Characteristics: 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Cicero, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. 
FACTFINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/11_5YR/DP03/1600000US1714351 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
Note that these figures represent the instructional expenditure per pupil, and not the full operating expenditure per pupil. ILLINOIS 
INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, supra note 8. Thus, the figures may be less than the foundation level amount set by the state. For the 
2012-2013 school year, the foundation level of funding per pupil was $6,119. Funding, ILL. STATE BOARD OF EDUC. (2013), 
http://www.isbe.net/funding/html/gsa.htm. 
10 See BAKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 2, 16-17 (discussing common characteristics of education funding systems in all states, and 
comparing education funding disparities between high- and low-income student populations in all states); see also U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCE: 2009 1 (2011), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/school/09f33pub.pdf (providing a 
detailed breakdown of revenue sources for schools in all fifty states). 
11 See CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, MONEY MATTERS: HOW THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL FUNDING SYSTEM CREATES 
SIGNIFICANT EDUCATIONAL FUNDING INEQUITIES THAT IMPACT MOST STUDENTS IN THE STATE 5 (2008) (The state’s relatively small 
contribution to school funding “pushes the primary obligation for education funding down to local resources, primarily property taxes, 
creating great disparities between districts across Illinois, based on local property wealth”). A 2010 report examining funding 
inequalities in public schools across the country found that Illinois has the third most regressive (i.e. providing more money to 
wealthier districts than poorer districts) public education finance system in the U.S. BAKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 16-18. This was 
measured by examining the distribution of state and local funding across schools districts relative to the percentage of impoverished 
students attending each district. Id. The report found that districts with lower levels of poverty received significantly more money per 
pupil than districts with high levels of poor students. Id. 
12 Perhaps the most significant difference between wealthy and poor districts is their ability to pay for highly educated teachers. 
Wealthy districts are able to spend approximately $18,000 more per teacher than less affluent districts. CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET 
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 9. Wealthy districts are able to attract significantly more teachers with advanced teaching 
degrees. Id. In 2012, about 90% of elementary school teachers in Winnetka School District 36, which is able to spend over $11,000 
per student, had masters degrees; in contrast, 9.4% of teachers in Burnham School District 154-5 (spending $5,411 per student) had 
masters degrees. ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, supra note 8. 
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In fact, education-funding issues are not new, nor have they gone unnoticed by Illinois 
lawmakers.
15
  Delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention (which produced Illinois’ current 
constitution) were well aware of the inequalities in the state’s school finance system and fought 
over potential constitutional remedies, but they ultimately failed to produce a solution.
16
  In 1992, 
a state constitutional amendment that would have largely eliminated Illinois’ property tax-based 
finance system was defeated in a referendum after heated public debate.
17
   
Following these failures, Illinois students in low-income school districts took their fight 
to the courts, first in Committee for Education Rights v. Edgar in 1996 and then Lewis E. v. 
Spagnolo in 1999.
18
  Despite successful legal challenges to property tax-based funding systems in 
several other states,
19
 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the current funding system in both 
cases.
20
  Moreover, the court held that school funding was a topic exclusively for the Illinois state 
                                                                                                                                                                     
13 Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 817 (Ill. 1999) (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the 
conditions in poor East St. Louis schools, including exposed asbestos, overflowing sewage pipes, broken windows, unheated 
classrooms, etc.). 
14 Students in wealthier school districts routinely score higher on the Illinois Standards Achievement Test (“ISAT”) and Prairie State 
Achievement Exam (“PSAE”), Illinois’ primary measure of student achievement for elementary and high school students, 
respectively. See Student Assessment—Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT), ILL. STATE BOARD OF EDUC., 
http://www.isbe.state.il.us/assessment/isat.htm (last updated Oct. 2013) [hereinafter Student Assessment Illinois] (discussing the ISAT, 
the primary tool for measuring student achievement throughout grades three through eight); Student Assessment—Prairie State 
Achievement Examination (PSAE), ILL. STATE BOARD OF EDUC., http://www.isbe.state.il.us/assessment/psae.htm (last updated Oct. 
2013) [hereinafter Student Assessment Prairie State] (discussing the PSAE, the primary measurement of student achievement for high 
school students); CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 10, 16. In 2012, for example, 96% of students in 
wealthy Northbrook School District 28 met or exceeded state reading standards on the ISAT. ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, 
supra note 8. In comparison, 62% of students in Calumet Public School District 132 met or exceeded reading standards that same 
year. Id. Similarly, 81% of students in Lake Forest CHSD 115 met or exceeded reading standards on the 2012 PSAE, while just 29% 
of J. Sterling Morton High School District 201 students met or exceeded the goals. Id. Nationally, students in poorer districts also tend 
to perform worse academically than their peers in wealthier districts. See Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental 
Right: Challenging the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 960-64 (1998) (describing poor academic 
performance in various low-income areas in the U.S.). 
15 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 72-74 (noting that at the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, education funding was a major 
concern of the delegates tasked with rewriting Illinois’ Article X education clause); infra Part III-B (summarizing the failed effort in 
1992 to amend Article X to increase funding equality in Illinois Public Schools). 
16 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 74-79, 84-86. Buresh notes that in 1969 a school district with an assessed property value of $5,462 per 
pupil would only generate $210 per pupil if it levied a 4% education property tax; the same tax levy assessed in a district with property 
values of $105,815 per pupil would generate $4,230. Id. Even if taxing at a significantly higher level, it would be virtually impossible 
for the property-poor district to fund its schools at a level comparable to the property-rich district. Id. at 73-74. As will be discussed 
later in this Article, the 1970 Constitutional Convention delegates settled on a re-worded education article that ultimately did little to 
change Illinois’ system of financing public schools. See infra Part IV-B (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court has held that much of 
the revised education clause—but not all, including the important phrase “high-quality”—was intended to be merely “hortatory,” and 
not legally binding on the state). 
17 See Constitution of the State of Illinois, Amendments and Conventions Proposed, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/conampro.htm [hereinafter Amendments and Conventions Proposed].  See generally Rob 
Karwath & Sue Ellen Christian, Education Amendment Falling Short, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 4, 1992), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-11-04/news/9204090956_1_amendment-victims-rights-advisory-referendum (summarizing 
the debate surrounding the amendment referendum). 
18 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1185-86 (Ill. 1996); Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 816-17. 
19 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 1258 (Cal. 1971) (finding that education is a fundamental right, and as such, 
applying strict scrutiny and finding that California’s education funding system violated both state and federal equal protection 
clauses); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Conn. 1996) (finding that Connecticut’s education funding system violated the 
state constitution’s education clause because the funding system had failed to eliminate spending disparities between wealthy and poor 
districts); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989) (finding that Kentucky’s education funding 
system was unconstitutional under the state constitution’s education clause because it failed to provide an “efficient system of 
common schools”); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 385 (N.J. 1990) (“[I]n order to provide a thorough and efficient education [under 
the state’s constitutional education clause], the State must assure that their educational expenditures per pupil are substantially 
equivalent to those of the more affluent suburban districts, and . . . special disadvantages must be addressed.”). 
20 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1180; Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 816. As of September 2011, plaintiffs have scored victories in twenty-seven 
states, while defendants have won in nineteen states excluding Illinois. NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, “EQUITY” AND “ADEQUACY” 
SCHOOL FUNDING LIABILITY COURT DECISIONS, SEPTEMBER 2011 (2011), http://schoolfunding.info/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Equity%E2%80%99-and-%E2%80%98Adequacy%E2%80%99-School-Funding-Decisions-by-
Outcome_2011.pdf [hereinafter EQUITY AND ADEQUACY DECISIONS]. 
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legislature to decide, ostensibly foreclosing future litigation.
21
  With federal litigation largely 
precluded by the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,
22
 the Edgar and Lewis E. decisions left potential school funding litigants with few 
legal options.
23
 
This Article will examine the Illinois Supreme Court’s education finance jurisprudence, 
arguing that the court should strike down the current funding system as unconstitutional under the 
Illinois State Constitution.  Part II examines the history of education finance litigation at the 
national level, discussing the United States Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Rodriguez and 
how it drove funding litigation to state supreme courts.  Part III discusses Illinois’ education 
finance system and Article X of the Illinois State Constitution, and summarizes the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s rulings in Edgar and Lewis E.  Part IV argues that (1) the court erred in finding 
education finance issues to be non-justiciable political questions in both cases; (2) Article X of 
the Illinois State Constitution should be read to guarantee some minimally adequate level of 
education quality; and (3) the current funding system does not rationally further the state’s 
preference for “local control” of public schools.  Part V concludes by prescribing a course of 
action for future plaintiffs, courts, and state legislatures in challenging and ultimately reforming 
Illinois’ school finance system.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
Despite several major plaintiffs’ victories in the past two decades, education-funding 
litigation remains a convoluted and politically volatile area of the law.
24
  In Rodriguez, Justice 
Powell noted “[e]ducation, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of 
intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems."
25
  The Rodriguez opinion spans 
133 pages and discusses the Equal Protection Clause, fundamental rights, federalism, and public 
education policy in the majority opinion alone.
26
  State supreme court cases contain similar legal 
sprawl, touching on issues including state-level separation of powers and the political question 
doctrine,
27
 state constitution education articles,
28
 federal and state equal protection clauses,
29
 
                                                        
21 See Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 816 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (In Edgar, the “court shut the courthouse 
door to claims alleging violations of section 1 of the education article of the Illinois Constitution,” and in Lewis E., “the majority nails 
that door shut”); Litigation- Illinois, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/il/lit_il.php3 (last updated 
Apr. 2010) (noting that subsequent cases have been dismissed for failure to state a justiciable claim). 
22 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, students and parents in a poor San Antonio school 
district challenged the state’s funding system under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 4-6. After 
finding that education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the majority then determined that 
education funding was a state matter best left to the Texas legislature. Id. at 38-39, 54. See infra Part II-B for a summary of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Rodriguez and its impact on school funding litigation. 
23 See Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 816-17 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the impact of the Lewis E. 
and Edgar decisions on future education funding litigation). Recently, plaintiffs again attempted to challenge the school funding 
system, this time under a novel taxpayer discrimination argument, but their case was dismissed in short order for lack of standing. See 
Carr v. Koch, 981 N.E.2d 326, 327, 330 (Ill. 2012); supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
24 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17-18 (noting the “novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions” at issue in Rodriguez); James 
A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764-66 (1992) (describing in vivid detail the 
various inconsistencies and contradictions in landmark education funding cases throughout the United States). 
25 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42. Note, however, that Justice Powell then goes out of his way to explain that education policy makers are 
sharply divided over the best method for funding schools. Id. While this is still true, it is a somewhat irrelevant point in school funding 
litigation. As this Article will demonstrate, most plaintiffs have not asked the court to formulate new funding systems, instead merely 
asking for declaratory judgment that a current system is unconstitutional. See infra Part IV-A (noting that education funding litigants 
usually seek declaratory judgment, and arguing that ruling on education finance litigation would not force the Illinois Supreme Court 
to “legislate from the bench”). Thus, courts ruling on education funding cases should not be concerned with developing an alternative 
funding system. 
26 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20-29, 30-39, 42-43, 55-59. 
27 The political question doctrine is a federal law principle that defines some issues as inherently political and thus inappropriate for 
courts to decide. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 58 (4th ed. 2010) (“[C]ertain 
4
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uniformity of taxation,
30
 state school code statutes,
31
 and the policy preference for local control of 
schools.
32
  
This Part will first briefly discuss Serrano v. Priest and other court cases that challenged 
state education funding systems before Rodriguez.  After summarizing the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Rodriguez, this Part will argue that the Court’s opinion clashes with (if not wholly 
contradicts) other education cases both before and after Rodriguez.  Finally, this Part explains the 
lasting impact of Rodriguez on modern education funding litigation. 
A. Serrano and the First Wave of Education Finance Cases 
Although school funding systems have faced legal challenges since at least 1912,
33
 the 
California Supreme Court’s 1971 ruling in Serrano v. Priest is considered the first modern 
landmark in education finance litigation.
34
  In Serrano, the California Supreme Court found that 
education plays a vital role in a citizen’s ability to participate politically and economically in 
American life, and as such, must be a fundamental right.
35
  Consequently, the court reviewed the 
state’s funding scheme under the strict scrutiny standard of review, requiring the state to 
demonstrate that the funding system was necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.
36
  Rejecting the state’s argument that the school funding system promoted local 
                                                                                                                                                                     
matters are really political in nature and best resolved by the body politic rather than suitable for judicial review.”). Essentially, the 
doctrine works to preserve the separation of powers. See Christine M. O’Neill, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use 
of the Political Question Doctrine to Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 545, 556-57 
(2009) (“The political question doctrine is the judiciary's attempt to respect the structural boundaries between the three branches of 
federal government.”); see also Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191-93 (Ill. 1996) (discussing the political 
question doctrine); O’Neill, supra (discussing and arguing against application of the federal political question doctrine in state 
education funding cases); supra Part IV-A (arguing against the Illinois Supreme Court’s use of the political question doctrine in Edgar 
and Lewis E.). 
28 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1183-93; Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 802-05; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 287-98 (N.J. 1973); see also 
infra Part IV-B (examining the Edgar court’s analysis of the Illinois State Constitution’s education clause). 
29 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249-60 (Cal. 1971); Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1193-94. 
30 Complaint at 7-11, Carr v. Koch, 981 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 2012) (No. 2010MR000169), available at 
http://www.bpichicago.org/pe_litigation.php (arguing that Illinois’ school funding system illegally discriminates against taxpayers in 
property-poor school districts because the system in effect forces them to pay higher property taxes than wealthier communities). 
Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case for lack of standing. See Carr v. Koch, 981 N.E.2d 326, 336 (Ill. 
2012).  
31 Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 812-15. 
32 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1195-96; see also infra Part IV-C (analyzing the Edgar court’s invocation of local control in its majority 
opinion). 
33 See Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in 
State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 231, 244 (1998) (citing Sawyer v. Gilmore, 83 A. 673 (Me. 1912) as 
the earliest major school funding litigation). 
34 See id. (citing Serrano as the first modern education finance case). The Serrano plaintiffs, a group of students and parents served by 
Los Angeles County public schools, argued that the state funding system’s heavy reliance on local property taxes produced 
unconstitutional disparities in per-pupil funding. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244. 
35 Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1255-60. Note that in Edgar, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a similar argument made by the plaintiffs, and 
held that it could only find fundamental rights “at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of 
nationally integrated government.” Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1194-95. 
36 Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1259-60. Briefly, federal courts review various government actions under three levels of judicial scrutiny 
depending on the type of right or class of citizens affected by the action (and, as is the case in Serrano, state courts typically adopt a 
substantially similar system of judicial review). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 390-91 (summarizing the three levels of 
judicial review). Courts will apply strict scrutiny to government actions that discriminate against a suspect class of citizens (such as 
those based on race, national origin, or alienage) or affect a fundamental right (such as the right to free speech). Id. This means that the 
court will not defer to the decisions of the other branches of government and will instead independently determine whether the action 
is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Id. On the other end of the spectrum, government actions that do not 
affect a suspect class or fundamental right are generally reviewed under the “rational relationship” test. Id. Here, a court will not 
conduct any significant independent review of the legislation, and instead will defer to the government in determining whether the 
action in question is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. Finally, more recent cases involving classifications 
based on sex or illegitimacy have invoked an “intermediate scrutiny” test that is less stringent than strict scrutiny, but also does not 
entirely defer to the state, in determining whether the challenged action bears a substantial relationship to an important governmental 
interest. Id. 
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control of schools,
37
 the court concluded that California’s funding system violated both state and 
federal equal protection clauses because it predicated a child’s education funding on the property 
wealth of his or her surrounding district.
38
  
The Serrano decision was the first to invalidate a state’s school funding system and 
represents the “first wave” of education finance litigation.39  From roughly the late 1960s to the 
1973 Supreme Court ruling in Rodriguez, “first wave” plaintiffs in school funding cases relied on 
federal and state equal protection clauses to argue that all school districts should receive 
substantially equal funding per pupil.
40
  Litigation thus turned on whether state courts found 
wealth to be a suspect classification or education to be a fundamental right, which would result in 
application of strict scrutiny review and probable victory for plaintiffs.
41
   
B. Rodriguez and the Removal of Education Funding Litigation from Federal Courts 
Just two years after Serrano, however, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Rodriguez dealt a serious blow to education finance reform by effectively removing school 
funding litigation from federal courts, and thus precluding any uniform, national invalidation of 
property tax-based funding systems.
42
  In 1971, parents and students in a poor San Antonio school 
district filed an equal protection complaint in federal district court, arguing that Texas’ funding 
system discriminated on the basis of wealth and denied plaintiffs their fundamental right to 
education.
43
  When Rodriguez came before the United States Supreme Court two years later, it 
presented three challenging issues for the Court’s decision: whether wealth should be treated as a 
suspect class similar to race and thus trigger strict scrutiny, whether the Federal Constitution 
protected education as a fundamental right similar to speech or privacy, and whether federal 
courts had the authority to review state education policy.
44
  
                                                        
37 “Local control” of schools—the idea that public schools are best run by local school boards and communities rather than the state—
is a common policy preference running throughout both state and federal school funding litigation. See infra Part IV-C.  
38 Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1259-64. The state defendants’ primary argument was that the California school funding system facilitated 
local fiscal control of schools. Id. at 1259. The California Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that “such fiscal freewill is a 
cruel illusion” for poor districts because their lack of property wealth often made it virtually impossible to generate funds comparable 
to that of wealthy districts, regardless of their willingness to tax at higher levels. Id. at 1259-60. The court’s critique of fiscal local 
control under property tax-based funding schemes would be echoed by Justice White’s dissent in Rodriguez. See San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63-70 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that in poor districts, “no matter how desirous parents 
are of supporting their schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the use of the real estate property tax”). As this 
Article will demonstrate, the Illinois school funding system also fails to provide poor districts with meaningful fiscal control of their 
schools. See infra Part IV-C (arguing that the Illinois Supreme Court should not continue to defer to the concept of “local control” of 
public schools). 
39 See generally Matt Brooker, Riding the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: Navigating Troubled Waters, 75 UMKC L. REV. 
183 (2006) (discussing the various “waves,” or phases of education finance litigation in the United States); Lynch, supra note 14, at 
968-84 (summarizing several landmark state supreme court school funding cases). 
40 See Brooker, supra note 39, at 185 (“Plaintiffs during the first wave of cases relied heavily on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution and asserted that all children within a state were entitled to have the same amount of money allocated and 
spent toward providing them a public education and/or were entitled to equal educational opportunities.”); see, e.g., Milliken v. Green, 
203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972). 
41 See Brooker, supra note 39, at 185; Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1259-66 (applying strict scrutiny review). Legal scholars generally view 
strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact” because laws do not often survive this level of scrutiny. See Gerald Gunther, 
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972) (describing strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). 
42 See Brooker, supra note 39, at 186 (noting that Rodriguez “all but eliminated the ability to attack school systems based on the 
Federal Constitution”); Lynch, supra note 14, at 968 (noting that since Rodriguez, plaintiffs have been “left with no other choice but to 
challenge” funding systems under state constitutional law). 
43 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11-15 (1973). The district court initially delayed hearing of the case for two years while the Texas legislature 
investigated possible reforms. Id. at 6 n.4. When the Texas legislature failed to act, the district court finally heard the case and ruled in 
favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 11-15. Following its ruling, the court stayed its decision for another two years but retained its right to 
fashion remedial actions in case the legislature failed to act. Id. at 6 n.5. 
44 See id. at 17-18 (noting the various “novel” and “complex” constitutional issues raised by the case). Before concluding its opinion, 
the Court re-emphasized the complexity of school funding issues in a “cautionary postscript” that warned such issues may be outside 
the ability or authority of the Court to adequately decide. Id. at 56-59. 
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The Court first found that classifications based on wealth are not suspect.
45
  The plaintiffs 
failed to define a clear “class” of impoverished students, the Court found, because they presented 
insufficient criteria for determining who would fall into this suspect class.
46
  Moreover, the 
plaintiffs had not been wholly deprived of educational opportunity.
47
  They had merely received a 
relatively worse educational experience than students in wealthier districts.
48
  Finally, the Court 
concluded by noting that wealth classifications generally lack the “traditional indicia of suspect-
ness” of racial classifications, solidifying the Court’s refusal to recognize the poor as a protected 
class.
49
 
The Court then turned to the issue of whether education is a fundamental right.
 50
  
Quoting Brown v. Board of Education, the Court acknowledged the importance of education in 
American society as well as the Court’s own unique treatment of education in its jurisprudence.51  
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that not all important rights are fundamental.
52
  Instead, 
fundamental rights must be found, explicitly or implicitly, within the Constitution itself.
53
  Simply 
put, education may be important to the exercise of constitutional rights, but because it is not 
promised by the Constitution itself, it is not a fundamental right.
54
 
By declining to recognize wealth as a suspect classification or education as a fundamental 
right, the Court determined it should apply a rational basis review to the Texas funding system.
55
  
The Court found it lacked the expertise and jurisdiction to pass judgment on Texas’ school 
funding system.
56
  Moreover, invalidating the Texas funding system would violate the long-
standing American tradition of locally controlled schools.
57
  Ultimately, reform might very well 
                                                        
45 Id. at 28-29. 
46 Id. at 20. The Court’s focus on the income level of individual persons or family units, however, seems misguided.  The thrust of the 
plaintiffs’ argument was that they were discriminated against as residents of property-poor districts. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281-82 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Regardless of variations in individual wealth 
amongst residents of a given district, the overall property-wealth of the district is quantifiable and easily comparable to that of other 
districts, and creates a clear member class of citizens negatively impacted by the state funding system. See infra Part IV-A (arguing 
that, within Illinois, making wealth comparisons between districts is easily facilitated by public financial data as well as the state’s 
own method of classifying districts within its funding system). 
47 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20-24 (finding that the plaintiffs’ lack of “personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation” of 
education). The Court distinguished the plaintiffs’ case from other “wealth class” cases where it believed poor parties were being 
wholly deprived of some benefit or right. Id. In Williams v. Illinois, for example, the Court struck down criminal penalties that 
imprisoned indigents if they were unable to pay a fine. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 236-38, 245 (1970). In Bullock v. Carter, 
the Court invalidated a filing-fee scheme for primary elections in Texas that required potential candidates to pay very large sums of 
money to get on the ballot, effectively precluding the poor from participation. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 135-36, 149 (1972).  
48 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23. 
49 Id. at 28-29 (“The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspect-ness: the 
class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”).  
50 Id. at 35-36. Education, the plaintiffs argued, is necessary for the proper exercise of voting and free speech rights; as such, the right 
to education is implicitly protected by the Constitution. Id. 
51 Id. at 29-30. In Brown, the Court noted that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.” 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
52 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“[T]he key to discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in comparisons of the 
relative societal significance of education.”). 
53 Id. In one of the most famous—and for education reformers, infamous—lines of the majority opinion, the Court emphasized that it 
could not guarantee citizens “the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice.” Id. at 36. Note that the Edgar court 
largely adhered to the Supreme Court’s fundamental rights analysis in Rodriguez, emphasizing that even critically important rights 
may not be fundamental. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1194-95 (Ill. 1996); infra Part III-C (summarizing 
Edgar and Lewis E.). 
54 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36. 
55 See id. at 41-50 (applying rational basis review to the Texas funding system). 
56 Id. at 44. Curiously, the majority nonetheless criticizes plaintiffs for not suggesting an alternative system of funding. Id. at 41 n.85 
(“Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace it.”). 
Given the Court’s steadfast refusal to rule on state education issues, it is unclear what value such a proposal would have had. 
57 Id. at 49. Local control essentially refers to the devolution of control of schools from state governments to local school boards. See 
Charles F. Faber, Is Local Control of Schools Still a Viable Option?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447, 447 (1991) (noting that 
“[m]uch of the responsibility for actually conducting educational programs has historically been delegated to local school districts, 
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have been needed, however, only the Texas state legislature had authority to make such 
decisions.
58
  The Supreme Court thus reversed the district court, ending the plaintiff’s fight.59 
1. The Supreme Court’s Inconsistent Treatment of Education as a Fundamental Right 
The Rodriguez decision appears to clash with (if not wholly contradict) the Court’s 
opinions in education cases both before and after Rodriguez.
60
  In Sweatt v. Painter (1950), a pre-
Rodriguez case, the Court held that Texas could not bar qualified African Americans from 
attending the University of Texas Law School even if it provided a separate, all-black alternative 
institution.
61
  Critically, the Court’s decision was heavily based on the fact that the alternative 
school was not comparable to the University of Texas in terms of educational quality, resources, 
and prestige.
62
  Although Sweatt involved a law school, and ultimately rested on the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court’s willingness to evaluate the schools’ relative quality clashes with 
the Rodriguez Court’s refusal to judge Texas’ public school policy, and its apparent acceptance of 
public schools providing vastly different levels of educational quality.
63
  In Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), also pre-Rodriguez, the Court stated that “education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments . . . the very foundation of good citizenship,” 
thus elevating the status of education beyond that of a “typical” right.64  
Cases after Rodriguez also call into question the Court’s refusal to recognize education as 
a fundamental right.
65
  In Ambach v. Norwick (1979), the importance of public education in civic 
life was the determinative factor in finding that a state may deny resident-aliens teaching 
certification.
66
  The Court upheld the teaching certification restriction, it explained, because some 
state functions are so critical to democratic self-governance that it is permissible to exclude all 
those who had “not become part of the process of self-government.”67  Nevertheless, Justice 
                                                                                                                                                                     
governed by local boards of education” and that “[l]ocal control of education manifests itself in an American invention, the local 
school board”). As this Article will demonstrate, however, such deference to the concept of local control is misguided. See infra Part 
IV-C (arguing that property tax-based funding systems do not give poor school districts any meaningful fiscal control); see also 
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259-60 (Cal. 1971) (finding that California’s school funding system failed to provide poor districts 
with local fiscal control). 
58 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58-59. It would take the Texas state legislature more than two decades—and prodding from several state 
supreme court decisions—before it passed meaningful education funding reform measures. See School Funding Cases in Texas, 
NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, http://schoolfunding.info/2011/10/school-funding-cases-in-texas/ (last updated Jul. 2013) 
(summarizing education funding litigation and legislative action in Texas following Rodriguez). 
59 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58-59. 
60 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 
(1979); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see Lynch, supra note 14, at 997 (noting that Plyler “conflicts sharply with the 
Rodriguez court's conclusion that a fundamental right to education does not exist”). 
61 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634-36. 
62 Id. at 632-34 (comparing, unfavorably, the number of faculty members, size of law libraries, existence of moot court teams and law 
review, professional affiliations, etc. of both schools). 
63 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that in Sweatt, the Court “acknowledged that inequality in the 
educational facilities provided to students may be discriminatory state action as contemplated by the Equal Protection Clause”).  
64 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. Brown, of course, was also decided on the basis of equal protection of African American students, and it 
did not rule on whether education is a fundamental right. Id. Nevertheless, it clearly characterized education as something more than 
just “important” to American life. See Greg Rubio, Note, Surviving Rodriguez: The Viability of Federal Equal Protection Claims by 
Underfunded Charter Schools, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1643, 1667 (2008) (arguing that the “remarkably sweeping recognition of the 
importance of education” in Brown suggested, at least immediately after the ruling, that the Court was ready to recognize a 
fundamental right to education). 
65 See Ambach, 441 U.S. 68; Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
66 Ambach, 441 U.S. at 74-75. Two foreign nationals, both long-time residents of the U.S. and married to Americans, were denied 
certification by New York State because they had not attained citizenship. Id. at 71-72.    
67 Id. at 74. The Court found that teaching in public schools “go[es] to the heart” of representative government because education 
fosters American values in children and prepares them to engage in civic life; thus, a state may have a legitimate interest in only 
employing U.S. citizens as teachers. Id. at 76. Under these circumstances, only rational relationship review should apply. Id. The 
Court’s reasoning in Ambach is difficult to reconcile with its rejection of the Rodriguez plaintiffs’ fundamental rights argument. 
Compare Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“It is appellees' contention [which the Court rejected] that education is distinguishable from other 
services and benefits provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded 
protection under the Constitution. . . . [T]hey insist that education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the 
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Powell—writing the majority opinion in both Ambach and Rodriguez—did not believe the case 
contradicted his previous reasoning.
68
  In Plyler v. Doe (1982), the Court invalidated a Texas law 
that withheld state funds from local school districts that educated illegal immigrant children.
69
  
Once again, the Court seemed to ascribe a unique “importance” to education beyond that of many 
other functions of the state.
70
 
2. Rodriguez’s Impact on School Funding Litigation 
Regardless of Rodriguez’s inconsistencies, the decision had a profound impact on future 
education funding cases.
71
  Although the California Supreme Court would affirm its Serrano 
decision in 1976 (in a second, follow-up opinion known as Serrano II) based on the state 
constitution’s equal protection clause,72 plaintiffs in post-Rodriguez cases shifted their focus to 
state constitution education clauses.
73
  In Robinson v. Cahill, decided just one month after 
Rodriguez, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state’s education funding system violated 
the New Jersey state constitution’s guarantee of a “thorough and efficient” system of public 
education found in the New Jersey state constitution’s education article.74  In time, state equal 
protection arguments largely ceded to education article complaints, and focused on education 
adequacy rather than absolute funding equality.
75
  Under this logic, plaintiffs argued that 
inequitable finance schemes denied certain students a minimum level of education quality.
76
  
Plaintiffs proceeding under education article/adequacy claims fared considerably better than those 
making state equal protection arguments similar to Serrano.
77
 
Some legal scholars have noted that the shift from federal to state claims in education 
funding litigation echoes Supreme Court Justice William Brennan’s call for a new judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                     
effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote.”), with Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76 
(“Public education . . . ‘fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.’  The importance of public schools in 
the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has 
been recognized by our decisions.”). 
68 Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78 n.7 (“As San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez recognized, there is no inconsistency between 
our recognition of the vital significance of public education and our holding that access to education is not guaranteed by the 
Constitution.”). 
69 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22, 229; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 467-68 (summarizing Plyler). 
70 While noting that, pursuant to Rodriguez, education is not a fundamental right, the Court nonetheless explained that “neither is 
[education] merely some governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation . . . the importance of 
education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.” 
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. Plyler largely rested on the premise that illegal immigrant children have not made the choice to illegally 
immigrate to the Untied States on their own, and should be distinguished from adult illegal immigrants (such as their parents). Id. at 
219-20. The case is nonetheless difficult to explain in relation to the Court’s denial of education as a fundamental right. See NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 594 (stating that the Court’s decision in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public School, 487 U.S. 450 (1988), 
which reaffirmed that education is not a fundamental right, is “difficult to explain” in relation to Plyler); see also Rubio, supra note 
64, at 1668 (suggesting that federal Equal Protection Clause claims regarding education rights should trigger “intermediate” scrutiny 
pursuant to Plyler). 
71 See Brooker, supra note 39, at 186 (noting that Rodriguez “all but eliminated the ability to attack school systems based on the 
federal Constitution”); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 545 (“Beginning with San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
plaintiffs concerned with educational equity have gradually lost access to the federal court system.”). 
72 Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 958-59 (Cal. 1976); see also Brooker, supra note 39, at 186 (discussing the impact of 
Rodriguez on the original Serrano decision). 
73 See Brooker, supra note 39, at 186 (noting that post-Rodriguez plaintiffs, often referred to as the “second wave” of school funding 
litigants, turned to state constitution equal protection clauses and education clauses in their arguments); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 
273, 287-98 (N.J. 1973) (resting its decision on a violation of the state’s education clause). 
74 Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295. 
75 See Brooker, supra note 39, at 186-88 (discussing the shift in legal arguments following Rodriguez). 
76 Id.; see, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Ky. 1989). 
77 NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, EDUCATION ADEQUACY LIABILITY DECISIONS SINCE 1989, SEPTEMBER 2011 (2011), 
http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/School-Funding-%E2%80%98Adequacy%E2%80%99-Decisions-by-
Outcome_2011.pdf [hereinafter ADEQUACY LIABILITY DECISIONS] (noting that twenty-two of thirty-four state adequacy cases have 
resulted in plaintiff victories, and that cases were pending in nine other states); see also Brooker, supra note 39, at 187-89 (noting that 
most cases arguing equal protection claims failed, whereas plaintiffs scored major victories under adequacy claims in Montana, 
Kentucky, and Texas). 
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federalism.
78
  As the Court took on a more conservative bent under Chief Justice Burger, Brennan 
argued that plaintiffs should turn to state courts for expanding protection of individual rights and 
liberties.
79
  Following Robinson, several state supreme courts answered Justice Brennan’s call and 
invalidated inequitable school funding systems under their state’s education clause.80  Yet when 
plaintiffs from some of Illinois’ most impoverished schools brought similar arguments before the 
Illinois Supreme Court, the court firmly rebuked Justice Brennan’s call.  
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Before examining the Illinois Supreme Court’s primary education funding decisions, 
Committee for Education Rights v. Edgar and Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, it is necessary to briefly 
review the mechanics of Illinois’s school funding system81 as well as the education clause of the 
Illinois Constitution.
82
  Thus, this Part will first explain Illinois’ public education finance system, 
and illustrate how it results in funding disparities between property-poor (those communities with 
low property values) and property-wealthy (those with high property value) school districts.  This 
Part will then review Article X of the Illinois State Constitution, which requires the state to 
establish a system of free public schools.  Finally, this Part summarizes the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Edgar and Lewis E., and discusses their impact on education funding litigation. 
A. Illinois’ Public School Finance System 
Illinois’ school funding system assigns school districts to one of three funding groups for 
the purpose of determining how much general state aid (“GSA”) will be given to each district.83  
Each year, the state first sets the foundation, or minimum level of funding per pupil for all public 
schools in Illinois.
84
  The state then calculates how much local revenue each district will 
theoretically be able to generate and apply towards achieving this foundation funding level.
85
  
This is done by multiplying the equalized assessed value of local property within a district by a 
standardized property tax rate, and then dividing this value by the school district’s average daily 
                                                        
78 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (arguing that 
plaintiffs should seek out expanded civil rights under state constitutions, and describing this push as a “new judicial federalism”); see 
also Blanchard, supra note 33, at 237 (tying Justice Brennan’s call for a new judicial federalism to the shift in education funding cases 
to state courts). 
79 See Brennan, supra note 78. Justice Brennan criticizes several of the Supreme Court’s civil liberties opinions issued under Chief 
Justice William Burger, including those affecting free speech; the rights of women, criminal defendants, and the poor; and tenured 
public employees. See id. at 495-96 (arguing that the Supreme Court in the 1970s had begun to “pull back” from its more progressive 
civil liberties jurisprudence in the previous decade). State courts and constitutions, Justice Brennan urged, are “font[s] of individual 
liberties” and should reach beyond the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in protecting individual rights. Id. Criminal law often provided 
examples of state supreme court independence in constitutional matters. See Blanchard, supra note 33, at 238-39 (citing as examples 
of state supreme court independence Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985), in which the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and State v. Morris, 
680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996), in which the Vermont Supreme Court expanded the expectation of privacy beyond the limits established by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)). 
80 See ADEQUACY LIABILITY DECISIONS, supra note 77 (noting that twenty-two of thirty-four state adequacy cases, which are 
generally argued based on state constitution education clauses, have resulted in plaintiff victories); see, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 
A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (resting its decision on a violation of the state’s education clause). 
81 See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05 (West 2013) (setting the Illinois general state aid system for the 2013-2014 school year). 
82 ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
83 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-1 to 18-20; see ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GENERAL STATE AID (2011), 
http://www.isbe.net/funding/pdf/gsa_overview.pdf [hereinafter GENERAL STATE AID] (providing an explanation of the education 
finance statute). 
84 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05; see GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83. For the 2012-2013 school year, the foundation level 
of funding per pupil was $6,119. Id.; 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. Due to reductions in General State Aid in the Illinois 
State Fiscal Year 2013 budget, however, the effective amount of funding per pupil during this time was actually $5,734. See id. 
85 See GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83 (providing additional explanation of the school funding statute). 
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attendance.
86
  Districts that will generate less than 93% of the foundation funding level based on 
this calculation are referred to as “foundation formula” districts.87  In most cases, the state will 
provide these districts with enough GSA to be able to fund at the foundation level for the school 
year.
88
  Districts that will generate 93% to 175% of the foundation funding level are referred to as 
“alternate formula” districts, and will receive GSA equaling between 5 and 7% of the current 
year’s foundation funding level.89  Finally, districts that will generate more than 175% of the 
foundation funding level receive a flat GSA grant of $218 per pupil.
90
  In 2011, approximately 
73.1% of Illinois’ public school children were served by property-poor foundation level districts, 
21.9% of students attended alternate formula districts, and just 5.0% of students attended flat 
grant districts.
91
 
 A few additional features of Illinois’ funding system are important to note.  All districts 
are statutorily required to fund their schools at the annual foundation level.
92
  For foundation and 
some alternate formula districts, this means that they must, at a minimum, assess education 
property taxes at the levels used by the state to calculate their GSA allotment.
93
  Flat grant 
districts, however, may assess property taxes at a lower rate as long as they still achieve the 
foundation funding level.
94
  While all districts are free to tax at a level higher than these 
minimum percentages, the Illinois School Code limits maximum tax assessment levels for school 
districts.
95
  In many districts, it may thus be legally impossible for foundation formula districts to 
fund their schools at a level comparable to wealthier flat grant districts, even if politically willing 
to tax property owners at a very high level.
96
  Nevertheless, poorer districts frequently do tax at a 
significantly higher level than wealthier districts in an attempt to provide greater funding to their 
schools.
97
     
                                                        
86 The rates are 2.3% for districts consisting of elementary and middle schools only, 1.05% for high school districts, and 3.0% for unit 
districts containing elementary, middle, and high schools. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(D)(3); see GENERAL STATE AID, 
supra note 83 (providing additional information on property taxing rates for the various types of school districts). 
87 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(E)(2). Note that revenue generated from a corporate personal property replacement tax is also 
added into this calculation. GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83. 
88 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(E)(2); see GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83 (providing additional explanation of the 
funding statute). 
89 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(E)(3); see GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83 (providing additional explanation of the 
funding statute). 
90 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(E)(4); see GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83 (providing additional explanation of the 
funding statute). 
91 GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83. 
92 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(B); see GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83 (providing additional explanation of the funding 
statute). 
93 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(E). 
94 Id.; GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83 (providing additional explanation of the funding statute). Although some flat grant districts 
do choose to tax at higher rates to maximize school funding, others can tax at rates lower than foundation or alternate formula districts 
and still generate more money to spend on students. For example, in 2012 Skokie School District 68 had an equalized assessed 
property value of $743,619 per pupil, a total school tax rate of $2 per $100, and spent $8,402 per pupil. ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE 
REPORT CARD, supra note 8. Conversely, Cicero School District 99 had an equalized assessed value of $78,372 per student, taxed at a 
rate of $2.79 per $100, but could only spend $5,368 per pupil. Id. 
95 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-2. Note that this provision does not apply to Chicago Public Schools. Id. 
96 GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83; see infra Part IV-C (arguing that because Illinois’ school funding system forces property-poor 
districts to tax within a statutorily prescribed range of tax rates, and because the system fails to yield sufficient funding for these 
districts, it limits true local control over school finance). 
97 See Secter, supra note 2 (noting that poor districts frequently tax at a much higher rate than wealthy districts, and citing as an 
example East St. Louis, which assesses property taxes six times higher than Rosemont, a relatively more prosperous suburb of 
Chicago). East. St. Louis has a median household income of $19,934, while Rosemont has a median household income of $39,196. 
Selected Economic Characteristics: 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, East. St. Louis, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, AM. FACTFINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/11_5YR/DP03/1600000US1722255 (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2013); Selected Economic Characteristics: 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Rosemont, Illinois, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. FACTFINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/11_5YR/DP03/1600000US1765819 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2013);see also Complaint, supra note 30 (comparing property tax rates in two foundation formula districts to the 
considerably lower tax rates in two flat grant districts). Illinois’ overall state tax system is considered one of the most regressive in the 
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B. The Education Clause of the Illinois Constitution 
Unlike the Federal Constitution, state constitutions include articles explicitly providing 
for some form of a public school system.
98
  Illinois is no exception—Article X, Section 1 of the 
Illinois State Constitution provides for a state-created system of free public schools.
99
 
 The education article was first added to Illinois’ constitution in 1870, and took its present 
form following revisions made at the 1970 Constitutional Convention.
100
  Illinois’ education 
article shares much of its language with other state education provisions,
101
 including phrases that 
have served as the basis for several plaintiff victories in education funding cases.
102
  A 1992 
amendment referendum, however, would have reformed Illinois’ school funding system just four 
years before Edgar.
103
  Following a bitter debate in the Illinois General Assembly, a bi-partisan 
coalition of urban Democrats and downstate Republicans voted to add the referendum to the 
November ballot.
104
  The referendum proposed adding language to Article X that would have 
forced the state to provide the majority of education funding in Illinois, effectively prohibiting 
                                                                                                                                                                     
nation. DAVIS ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION AND ECON. POL’Y, WHO PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEM IN ALL 
50 STATES 4 (3rd ed. 2009). The poorest 20% of residents pay on average 13% of their total annual income towards taxes, whereas the 
middle 60% pay about 9.7% of their income towards taxes, and the top 1% pay about 4.9%. Id. at 42. Similarly, Illinois’ poorest 
residents tend to pay about five times as much of their annual income towards property taxes as the state’s wealthiest residents. Id. 
98 See Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 
ALB. L. REV. 1147, 1148 n.9 (2000) (citing education clauses for all fifty states). 
99           A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their 
capacities. 
 
The state shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services. 
Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other free education as 
the General Assembly provides by law. 
 
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education. 
 
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
100 BURESH, supra note 2, at 34; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
101 See Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Schools, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 
814-16 (1985) (categorizing state education articles into four groups depending on the “strength” of their wording). The weakest 
provisions merely provide for system of “free” schools; most education articles contain this language. Id. at 815. The next strongest 
provisions contain some characterization of quality of the education system, typically “thorough and efficient.” Id. This language is 
used in the education articles of New Jersey, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, and many other states. Id. at 815 n.144. Still stronger are 
those that compel state legislatures to specifically provide for state education systems. Id. at 815-16. Finally, the strongest provisions 
include some language (such as “fundamental” or “paramount”) that makes education a top priority of state government. Id. at 816, 
816 n.146. Washington, Maine, Michigan, and Illinois are some of the states in this final category. Id. at 816 n.146. 
102 Several courts in other states have relied on the words “thorough and efficient,” or substantially similar language, to invalidate 
funding systems. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 
1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979). But see 
Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191-94 (Ill. 1996) (discussing, unfavorably, cases in other states that have relied 
on this language to invalidate state funding systems). 
103 See Hugh Dellios & Rick Pearson, School-Fund Question on Nov. 3 Ballot, CHI. TRIB. (May 1, 1992), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-05-01/news/9202080590_1_state-income-tax-amendment-school-funding-task-force 
(summarizing generally the 1992 amendment referendum); Karwath & Christian, supra note 17 (discussing the failure of the 
amendment). 
104 The Illinois House of Representatives voted 71-44 to include the referendum, including 61 Democratic and 10 Republican “yea” 
votes, but not before a post-debate fist-fight between downstate and suburban Chicago representatives. Dellios & Pearson, supra note 
103. The tenor of the debate surrounding the amendment vote is illustrative of the politics involved in school funding reform. While 
pushes for reform are traditionally associated with larger urban districts—the plaintiffs in Edgar included Chicago Public Schools as 
well as districts located in Elgin and Rockford; the plaintiffs in Lewis E. were from East St. Louis—downstate Republicans also 
strongly supported the referendum. Id. This is because rural areas generally have low property values as well as high transportation 
costs for students living far from schools. See CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 13-14 (noting the “stark” 
disparity in funding between wealthier school districts in the northern part of Illinois and poorer downstate districts south of Interstate 
80). Thus, rural schools often suffer from the same sort of chronic underfunding typical of large, urban schools. See generally id. 
(noting that most downstate school districts are foundation formula districts). As one might expect, opposition to funding reform 
usually comes from wealthy districts that fear that any changes in the financing scheme would result in higher taxes that ultimately 
benefit poor districts and not their own. Dellios & Pearson, supra note 103. 
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Illinois’ property tax-based system.105  The language would have also strengthened Article X’s 
language to clearly define education as a fundamental right receiving enhanced protection from 
the courts.
106
  Ultimately, the amendment was defeated at the polls, largely based on fears of 
increased taxes and decreased funding for wealthier districts.
107
 
C. The Major Illinois School Funding Cases: Edgar and Lewis E. 
Around the time of the 1992 amendment referendum, a group of more than sixty school 
districts, students, and parents filed a suit in state court seeking declaratory judgment that Illinois’ 
school funding system was unconstitutional.
108
  The plaintiffs’ primary claims alleged that the 
school funding system violated the Illinois State Constitution’s equal protection clause and 
Article X because it failed to remedy the significant funding disparities between wealthy and poor 
districts.
109
 
When Committee for Education Rights v. Edgar came before the Illinois Supreme Court 
in 1996, the court’s first task was determining exactly what education rights, if any, were 
guaranteed by Article X.
110
  The plaintiffs argued that the disparities produced by the state’s 
funding system violated Article X’s guaranty of an “efficient” educational system, and that the 
system prevented children in poor districts from attaining a “high quality” education.111  
Crucially, the court observed that the plaintiffs had made both equity and adequacy arguments.
112
  
While the former claim would require a construction of Article X to determine whether the word 
“efficient” means “equal,” the latter claim raised the issue of whether the court had the 
                                                        
105 The amendment would have incorporated the following language into Article X, Section 1:  
1. Education of all persons is a fundamental “right,” not just a “goal” of the state government. 
2. It is the “paramount duty” of the State to: 
a) provide a thorough and efficient system of high quality public education, and; 
b) guarantee equality of educational opportunity as a fundamental right. 
3. The State has the “preponderant financial responsibility” for financing public education. 
 
League of Women Voters of Illinois, Statewide Referendums, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 25, 1992), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-10-
25/news/9204060922_1_public-education-education-amendment-jim-edgar; see also Dellios & Pearson, supra note 103 (summarizing 
the potential impact of the amendment on the state funding system); Karwath & Christian, supra note 17 (noting that “perennially 
cash-strapped schools stand to benefit most” from the amendment). 
106 Dellios & Pearson, supra note 103 (“Proponents say the amendment is intended to strengthen language in the Illinois 
Constitution.”). See infra Part IV-B for a more extensive discussion of Article X’s language and legal ramifications. 
107 Amendments and Conventions Proposed, supra note 17. Although there were 1,882,569 votes for the amendment, more than those 
voting against it, the number nonetheless fell short of the three-fifths majority vote needed to pass constitutional amendments in 
Illinois. See id.; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2(b); see also Dellios & Pearson, supra note 103 (noting that leading up to the amendment 
vote, Illinois residents could expect to hear “frequent warnings about massive income-tax hikes,” that then-governor Jim Edgar 
warned the amendment could lead to a fifty percent increase in the state income tax, and that representatives from wealthier districts 
believed the state’s funding system already “unfairly gives poorer areas a disproportionate share of state funds”); Karwath & 
Christian, supra note 17 (noting that the amendment fell short due to opposition from voters in wealthy suburban counties outside of 
Chicago who were concerned that the amendment could lead to property tax increases). 
108 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Ill. 1996); Dellios & Pearson, supra note 103. A “declaratory 
judgment” is a binding adjudication of one or more party’s rights, “whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed.” 
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-701 (West 2013). 
109 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1182-83. According to the plaintiffs, during the 1989-90 school year, the average tax base in the wealthiest 
10% of districts was thirteen times larger than that of those in lowest 10%, allowing wealthy districts to spend substantially more on 
their students. Id. at 1182. One plaintiff district noted that it could not afford to clean up exposed asbestos, patch leaking roofs, or 
replace rotting football bleachers. Id. at 1197-98 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
110 The plaintiffs’ case had been dismissed by the circuit and appellate courts for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1182-83 (majority 
opinion). 
111 By alleging that the state funding system was not “efficient,” the plaintiffs asserted that children in poor districts were receiving a 
comparatively worse education that those in wealthier districts; by alleging that students poor districts were not receiving a “high 
quality” education, however, the plaintiffs were asking the court to find their students’ education absolutely inadequate. Id. 
112 Id. at 1183; see also supra Part II (contrasting the equity claims made in Serrano to the adequacy claims made in Robinson and 
other post-Rodriguez cases). 
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constitutional authority to adjudicate an adequacy claim at all.
113
  The plaintiffs also argued that 
the final line of Article X, Section 1, added at the 1970 Constitutional Convention, required the 
state to be the primary source of funding for public schools.
114
 
The court first determined the meaning of “efficient” in Article X.115  Examining the 
1970 Constitutional Convention record, the court found that the delegates did not intend for 
“efficient” to mean “equal,” and instead simply wanted the word to retain the limited meaning it 
had taken on since it was first used in Article VIII of the 1870 constitution.
116
  The court further 
found that opinions in other states addressing this issue, including many of the most significant 
plaintiff victories following Rodriguez, were inapposite to the case at hand or wrongly decided.
117
  
Thus, Article X’s use of “efficiency” could not be read to guarantee equal educational funding.118 
The court next turned to the final sentence in Article X, Section 1—“[t]he State has the 
primary responsibility for financing the system of public education.”119  The court noted that the 
line was added only after two alternative proposals—both of which explicitly delegated funding 
responsibilities to the state and limited local property tax funding—were voted down by the 
delegates.
120
  Moreover, the court noted that the delegate who proposed the language intended 
merely "to put the Convention on record” (in other words, to put the Convention on notice that a 
change needed to be made), and that the line was “only to express a goal or objective, and not to 
state a specific command."
121
  As such, the sentence did not provide a legal basis to challenge the 
state’s funding system.122 
Finally, the court analyzed the plaintiffs’ adequacy claim—that they were being denied a 
“high quality” education.123  The court noted that the 1870 education article had originally 
assigned responsibility for providing public education to the “General Assembly,” or state 
legislature.
124
  Even though the 1970 Convention delegates substituted “the state” for “General 
Assembly,” the court found that Article X retained the 1870 draft’s limited jurisdiction for 
courts.
125
  The court also applied the United States Supreme Court’s political question test, 
                                                        
113 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1183. Following Rodriguez, most successful state-level education funding cases made adequacy arguments 
alleging students in poor districts were being deprived of some base level of educational opportunity. See Brooker, supra note 39, at 
187-89 (noting that most cases arguing equal protection claims failed, whereas plaintiffs scored major victories under adequacy claims 
in Montana, Kentucky, and Texas); see, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 201, 210 (Ky. 1989). 
114 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1190 (“[P]laintiffs stress that while the 1870 Constitution specified that the General Assembly shall provide a 
system of public schools, the 1970 Constitution expressly places that duty on the State.”); see also BURESH, supra note 2, at 84-86, 
114-18 (summarizing the debate over Article X’s final sentence). 
115 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1185-86. 
116 Id. at 1186. Before the 1970 Constitutional Convention, the Court’s interpretation of “efficient” in the 1870 education clause held 
that issues of education “efficiency” could only be determined by the state legislature, with the narrow exception that courts could 
judge whether school boundaries were drawn efficiently in terms of geography.  Id.; see, e.g., People ex rel. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 
5 v. Decatur Sch. Dist. No. 61, 203 N.E.2d 423, 424-25 (Ill. 1964); People v. Deatherage, 81 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ill. 1948). 
117 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1188-89. The Court further emphasized its negative view of recent education funding litigation by finding 
Abbott v. Burke (in which the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the state’s funding system following several years of stalled 
legislative reform efforts) was simply decided incorrectly. Id. at 1188. 
118 Id. at 1186. 
119 Id. at 1186-87. 
120 Id. at 1186. 
121 Id. at 1187. 
122 Id. See infra Part IV-B for an analysis of the 1970 Constitutional Convention record. 
123 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1189. The plaintiff’s central argument was that Article X’s assertion that “the state” was responsible for 
providing an efficient system of public schools placed responsibility for maintaining high quality schools on all three branches of the 
government. Id. at 1190-91. As such, the plaintiffs argued, ruling on the adequacy of public education would fit squarely within the 
court’s jurisdiction. Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1190 (“Courts may not legislate in the field of public education any more than they may legislate in any other area. . . . Courts 
are no more capable of defining ‘high quality educational institutions and services’ under our present constitution than they were able 
to define a ‘good common school education’ under the 1870 Constitution.”). 
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developed in Baker v. Carr, to the adequacy issue.
126
  The court found that there was “a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for defining “high quality” and determining 
whether the plaintiffs had received an adequate education.
127
  The court further emphasized that a 
ruling on the issue would be anti-democratic because the justices were less politically accountable 
to the public than state representatives.
128
  Thus, the court found that claims of inadequate 
educational opportunity were essentially political questions best left to the General Assembly.
129
  
With the education clause issues settled, the court turned to the plaintiffs’ state equal 
protection argument, dismissing the claim based on the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Rodriguez.
130
  Because wealth was not a suspect classification and because education was not a 
fundamental right, rational basis review would apply.
131
  As in Rodriguez, the court found that 
local control of public schools was a legitimate state interest effectively served by the state’s 
funding scheme.
132
   
The Edgar court’s ruling was a stunning defeat for education reformers.  Not only had the 
court rendered Article X’s language largely toothless,133 but it also erected a barrier between 
future litigants and the court by finding school funding issues outside the purview of the 
judiciary.
134
  Three years later, a second school funding case affirmed and reinforced the court’s 
jurisprudence.
135
 
In 1999, children and parents in Illinois’ East St. Louis’ school district came before the 
Illinois Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the school funding system produced 
underfunded, dilapidated schools within their district, and thus violated Article X.
136
  Once again, 
the plaintiffs made an adequacy claim, as well as claims based on the state’s due process clause, 
Illinois School Code, and common law principles.
137
  The court examined the education clause 
claim first and reaffirmed its holding in Edgar, that it had no authority to judge the adequacy of 
                                                        
126 Id. at 1191. In Baker, an equal protection case involving discriminatory political districting, the United States Supreme Court 
provided a six-factor test to determine when an issue was “political” and thus outside the gambit of the courts. Id. If the issue involved 
any of the following six factors, it could not be reviewed by the court: 
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; [(2)] 
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; [(3)] or the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; [(4)] or the 
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate 
branches of government; [(5)] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; [(6)] or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. 
 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See infra Part IV-A for an analysis of the Illinois Supreme Court’s use of the Baker standard. 
127 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1191. 
128 Id. Note, however, that Illinois Supreme Court justices are elected, and serve ten-year terms. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 10. 
129 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1191 (noting that to rule on the merits would be a violation of the separation of powers); see O’Neill, supra 
note 27 (discussing how a minority of state courts, including Illinois, have avoided full adjudication of adequacy claims based on the 
political question doctrine and deference for the separation of powers). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 58-66 
(providing a general overview of the United States Supreme Court’s political question jurisprudence). 
130 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1193-94; see supra Part II-B (summarizing the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Rodriguez). 
131 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1193-96. 
132 Id. at 1195-96. 
133 This is despite the fact that some have read Illinois’ education clause as one of the strongest in the nation. See William E. Thro, 
Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 1639, 1667-69 (1989) (noting that Illinois’ education clause is among the strongest worded clauses of all state constitutions). 
134 See Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 816 (Ill. 1999) (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that in 
Edgar the “court shut the courthouse door to claims alleging violations of section 1 of the education article of the Illinois 
Constitution”); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27 (“Unlike other restrictions on judicial review—doctrines such as case or 
controversy requirements, standing, ripeness and prematurity—all of which may be cured by different factual circumstances, a holding 
of nonjusticiability [premised on the political question doctrine] is absolute in its foreclosure of judicial scrutiny.”). 
135 Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 800. 
136 Id. at 800-01. 
137 Id. at 801-02. 
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the state’s public education system.138  The court then turned to the plaintiffs’ remaining claims 
and dismissed them in short order.
139
  Again citing to Rodriguez, the court dismissed the due 
process claim, reasoning that there was no fundamental right to education.
140
  The court then 
dismissed the school code claims for failure to point to a specific provision in the code that had 
been violated, and the common law claims failed due to the plaintiffs’ failure to prove actual 
harm.
141
  
In his dissent, Justice Charles E. Freeman disclaimed the precedent set by Edgar and 
Lewis E.
142
  East St. Louis schools were in deplorable condition, exposing students to asbestos, 
overflowing sewage pipes, broken fire alarms, unheated classrooms, and fire-damaged school 
libraries.
143
  The court’s opinions in Edgar and Lewis, Justice Freeman believed, permanently 
precluded the court from ever taking on the gross inequalities in Illinois’ public schools, leaving 
the matter to languish under legislative inaction.
144
  
                                                        
138 Id. at 804 (“[Q]uestions relating to the quality of education are solely for the legislative branch to answer." quoting Comm. for 
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996)). The plaintiffs argued that the Edgar opinion was not dispositive because 
the plaintiffs in that case had sought a “high quality” education rather than a minimal level of education, however the court found the 
difference indistinguishable. Id. The plaintiffs also argued that the historical education clause “efficiency” exception, whereby the 
court has the limited authority to determine the fairness of newly drawn school district boundaries, should apply because East. St. 
Louis students were being entirely deprived of educational opportunity (much like a student included in district boundaries that place 
his home school so far away from his residence that he cannot attend). Id. The court, however, simply did not agree that the students 
were being wholly deprived of education. Id. The boundary exception would only apply, the court speculated, in situations where a 
“district provides a school that consists of nothing more than a vacant building marked with the word ‘School.’” Id. 
139 Id at 805-16. 
140 Id. at 805. The plaintiffs also made a due process argument that, because students in Illinois are legally required to attend schools, 
and because the school facilities in East. St. Louis were in dangerous disrepair, the state was in effect forcibly subjecting them to a 
harmful environment. Id. at 805-11. The court rejected this theory as well, finding that compulsory education laws did not raise due 
process issues because the precedent cited by the plaintiffs—cases involving harmful prisons—were legally dissimilar. Id. at 805-09. 
Furthermore, despite the poor condition of many East St. Louis schools, the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any actual harm 
caused by the facilities. Id. at 808-11. 
141 Id. at 813-16. The plaintiffs had based their common law claim on premises liability, alleging that the schools their children 
attended were physically dangerous due to their lack of maintenance. Id. At common law, negligence claims require plaintiffs to show 
actual harm or an invasion of some interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). The court further held that a 
permanent injunction was inappropriate because the plaintiffs had failed to point to specific hazardous condition that could lead to 
irreparable injury. Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 815-16. 
142  “In [Edgar], this court shut the courthouse door to claims alleging violations of section 1 of the education article 
of the Illinois Constitution. In this case, the majority nails that door shut. The majority holds that these plaintiffs 
may not-not do not, or could not, but may not-state a cause of action for a declaratory judgment based on a 
violation of the education article.”  
 
 Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 816 (internal citations omitted) (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
143 Id. at 817. Justice Freeman quoted extensively from the plaintiffs’ complaint: 
By any reasonable measure, the public schools of District 189 are neither safe nor adequate. Strangers wander 
in and out of junior high schools. Fire alarms malfunction, and firefighters find emergency exits chained shut as 
they rescue children from burning schools. Classrooms are sealed to protect students from asbestos and 
dangerous structural flaws. In dark corridors, light bulbs go unreplaced and rain seeps through leaky roofs. In 
heavy rains, backed-up sewers flood school kitchens, boilers, and electrical systems, resulting in student 
evacuations and cancelled classes. Bathrooms are unsanitary and water fountains are dry or spew brown water. 
In winter, students sit through classes wearing heavy coats because broken windows and faulty boilers go 
unrepaired. They struggle to learn using meager instructional equipment and tattered, dated textbooks. School 
libraries are locked or destroyed by fire.  
 
Id. 
144 Id. This is not to say, however, that no other legal challenges have been attempted since Lewis E. In March 2010, the Chicago-
based public policy organization Business and Professional People for the Public Interest (“BPI”), in conjunction with their pro bono 
partner Sidley Austin, filed a school funding suit against State Superintendent of Education Christopher Koch, Governor Quinn, and 
the Illinois State Board of Education. See Complaint, supra note 30, at 1-3. Working around Edgar and Lewis E.’s constraining 
precedent, the plaintiffs argued that the state’s school funding system effectively forced residents of property-poor school districts to 
pay property taxes at significantly higher rates than residents of property-rich districts, a violation of the state constitution. See id. 
Additionally, the suit alleged that various other elements of how the state now runs public schools, including increases in state-level 
performance requirements and standardized testing, have effectively ended “local control” of public schools. See id. Nevertheless, the 
suit was dismissed in short order by the Illinois Supreme Court in late 2012, ruling that because localities ultimately set local property 
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 Evidence suggests Justice Freeman’s fears were well founded.145  While the Edgar 
majority’s minimalist reading of Article X was fairly accurate,146 the delegates to the 1970 
Constitutional Convention nonetheless believed that Article X’s strong wording would compel 
the Illinois state legislature to pass significant funding reforms in order to remedy educational 
inequality.
147
  More than forty years later, the legislature has yet to act.
148
  In other states as well, 
legislative inaction has often prevented meaningful reform.
149
  Thus, it may be time to once again 
challenge Illinois’s school funding system in court. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
Since 1999, the Illinois state legislature has not reformed the state’s education funding 
system, and the state continues to fund schools at one of the lowest rates in the U.S.
150
  With 
Rodriguez preventing plaintiffs from pursuing federal claims against the Illinois state 
government, and Edgar and Lewis E. ostensibly preventing state claims, it would appear 
education reformers are left with few options.  
As this Part will demonstrate, however, the Edgar and Lewis E. opinions leave open a 
few points of attack for future litigants.  The Illinois Supreme Court’s reliance on the United 
States Supreme Court’s political question jurisprudence, which precludes courts from hearing 
certain inherently political issues, defers unnecessarily to federal law, and also contradicts the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s own political question precedent.  Moreover, the Edgar court’s 
interpretation of Article X failed to define a key provision—whether the promise of a “high 
quality” education establishes some minimal level of educational adequacy.151  Finally, the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s deference to local control is unnecessary and ignores the fact that the 
current funding system does not provide meaningful control for property-poor school districts. 
A. The Illinois Supreme Court’s Misapplication of the Federal Political Question Doctrine in 
Edgar and Lewis E. 
Before examining the Edgar and Lewis E. courts’ political question analysis, some 
background on the doctrine is necessary.  The political question doctrine is a federal law principle 
that preserves the separation of powers by helping courts to determine when ruling on an issue 
                                                                                                                                                                     
taxing rates, the plaintiffs’ injuries were not properly traceable to the named defendants and thus could not provide standing. See Carr 
v. Koch, 981 N.E.2d 326, 331-36 (Ill. 2012). 
145 See Secter, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
146 See infra Part IV-B (analyzing the intentions of the 1970 Constitutional Convention delegates). 
147 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 126 (quoting Malcolm Kamin, a member of the Convention’s education committee, as stating after 
the Convention that “[i]f the legislature and the new State Board of Education will take the school financing language for what it is—
the statement of a pressing problem and the urgent prayer for a fair solution—then they will act to equalize educational opportunity 
and the tax burdens of educational financing without further judicial intervention”). 
148 See Secter, supra note 2 and accompanying text; Thomas D. Wilson & John K. Wilson, Equalizing School Funding and the 1970 
Constitutional Convention, ILL. ISSUES, Mar. 1992, at 21, 21, available at http://www.lib.niu.edu/1992/ii920321.html (stating that 
“[t]he hope for equalizing funding through the legislature has never been fulfilled” since the 1970 Convention, but funding disparities 
between rich and poor districts have greatly increased). 
149 In Rodriguez, the Texas district court initially delayed hearing of the case for two years while the Texas legislature unsuccessfully 
investigated possible reforms. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1973). After invalidating the funding 
scheme, the court stayed its decision for another two years but retained its right to fashion remedial actions in case the legislature 
failed to act. Id. at 6 n.5. In New Jersey, Robinson v. Cahill first invalidated the state’s funding system in 1973, but the legislature did 
not pursue true reform until after Abbott v. Burke was decided in 1997. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 287-298 (N.J. 1973); 
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Lynch, supra note 14, at 974 (summarizing education reform in New Jersey). 
150 See supra Part I (summarizing the economic shortfalls and inequalities Illinois public schools currently face). During the 2011-
2012 school year, just 32.5% of public school funding came from the state. 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Total Revenues and 
Percentage Distribution, supra note 4.  
151 See infra Part IV-B (providing an analysis of the 1970 Constitutional Convention record and what it suggests about the meaning of 
Article X). 
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would encroach on the authority of the executive or legislature.
152
  Because the United States 
Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to interpret the Federal Constitution,
153
 it also has the 
final authority to determine when an issue or responsibility has been delegated to a particular 
branch of the government.
154
  The Court outlined its current political question doctrine standard in 
1962 in Baker v. Carr.
155
  Holding that mere political sensitivity did not make an issue a political 
question,
156
 the Court formulated a six-factor test to determine whether an issue was a political 
question and thus non-justiciable.
157
  If the issue involved any of the following six factors, it 
could not be reviewed by the court: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; (2) or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it; (3) or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; (4) or the impossibility of a court's 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of 
government; (5) or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; (6) or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.
158
  Nevertheless, even after Baker, application of the political 
question doctrine in the Court’s opinions has remained fairly limited.159   
In contrast, some state supreme courts have readily invoked the doctrine in the context of 
education finance cases.
160
  As many legal scholars have argued, however, there is nothing 
explicitly binding state courts to the Supreme Court’s political question precedent when ruling on 
state constitutional law.
161
  The political question doctrine is rooted in the Federal Constitution’s 
                                                        
152 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation 
of powers.”); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 58-66 (providing a general overview of the United States Supreme 
Court’s political question jurisprudence); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 555-56 (“The political question doctrine is the judiciary's attempt 
to respect the structural boundaries between the three branches of federal government.”). 
153 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 1-11 (summarizing 
the United States Supreme Court’s judicial review authority). 
154 Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. Early in the Court’s history, the political question doctrine most often arose in cases involving the Guaranty 
Clause of Article IV, Section 4. See O’Neill, supra note 27, at 556; see, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1849). Generally, 
these cases involved a dispute over an elected office, a matter the Court believed it lacked authority to decide. In Luther v. Borden, 
plaintiffs alleged the Rhode Island government failed to satisfy the Constitution’s guaranty of a republican government. Id. The Court 
refused to decide the case, instead asserting that either the President or Congress must resolve the conflict. Id.; see also O’Neill, supra 
note 27, at 556 (noting that “[v]ery early on, the Supreme Court used the doctrine to avoid political representation issues under the 
Guaranty Clause of the Constitution” and discussing Luther v. Borden). 
155 Baker, 369 U.S. at 198-99. In Baker, the court was presented with the issue of whether voting districts that, due to population shifts, 
effectively diluted the voting power of a particular voting group violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 187-88. The defendants 
argued that issues of political reapportionment involved political questions, and as such, the court lacked authority to decide the 
matter. Id. at 197-98. 
156 Id. at 217 (“The doctrine of which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’ The courts cannot reject as 
‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”). 
157 Id. 
158 Id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 59-60 (summarizing Baker’s impact on political question jurisprudence). 
159 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 61-66 (discussing the political question doctrine’s limited application to certain issues 
involving foreign affairs and war, constitutional amendments, impeachment, political gerrymandering, apportionment of congressional 
districts among states, and Origination Clause cases); Blanchard, supra note 33, at 272 (stating that Supreme Court commentators 
have observed a decrease in the use of the political question doctrine since the early 1960s); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 557-60 (noting 
that the doctrine has been limited in application to questions of political districting and foreign affairs, and then summarizing the few 
cases since Baker in which it has been at issue). 
160 See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 802-03 (Ill. 
1999); Neb. Coal.for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007) (formally adopting the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Baker test, finding that issues of education adequacy are political questions for the legislature to decide, and upholding the 
Nebraska state school funding system); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-58 (R.I. 1995) (upholding Rhode Island’s 
funding system, and finding that the determination of what constitutes an adequate or equal education is a political question reserved 
for the state general assembly). 
161 See Brennan, supra note 78, at 501 (“[S]tate courts that rest their decisions wholly or even partly on state law need not apply 
federal principles of standing and justiciability that deny litigants access to the courts.”); Blanchard, supra note 33, at 233 (“State 
court reliance on federal separation of powers and political question doctrine jurisprudence is problematic because these doctrines are 
not freely transferrable to state constitutional analysis.”); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 11 (“The supreme court of a state is 
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separation of powers, and as such has no real applicability to state constitutional jurisprudence.
162
  
Furthermore, unlike federal courts, which are courts of limited jurisdiction, state courts are courts 
of general jurisdiction, and they retain significant common law powers not afforded to the federal 
judiciary.
163
  As such, state courts are able to “make law” much more so than federal courts, 
resulting in a fundamentally different relationship between state government branches than that of 
their federal counterparts.
164
  As a policy matter, too, strict adherence to the political question 
doctrine is unnecessary.
165
  In many states (including Illinois), state supreme court justices are 
elected, making them politically accountable for their opinions.
166
  Moreover, state supreme court 
opinions are easier to overrule than United States Supreme Court opinions because state 
constitutions are more malleable.
167
 
Regardless of the Illinois Supreme Court’s justification for adopting federal political 
question jurisprudence,
168
 its application in Edgar and Lewis E. is also at odds with its own past 
political question cases.
169
  Cases involving political question issues prior to the education cases 
are few and far between, generally involved disputes over elections, and generally barred courts 
from ruling on any politically-tinged issue.
170
  In Donovan v. Holzman (1956), however, the court 
                                                                                                                                                                     
truly the highest court in terms of this body of law . . . [i]t is free to interpret state laws or the state constitution in any way that does 
not violate principles of federal law.”); Gardner, supra note 24, at 808-09 (“[I]t is certainly possible for a state constitution to contain a 
political question doctrine, and it is even possible for the state doctrine to be so similar to the federal version that precisely the same 
analysis could be used for both—possible, but highly unlikely.”); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 578-79 (“It does not follow that the same 
barriers (political question doctrine) would apply to state court action.”). 
162 See Blanchard, supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
163 See Gardner, supra note 24, at 809 (“[V]irtually all state courts have significant common law powers that federal courts lack. The 
power to elaborate the common law is a power to make law.”); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 579 (noting state courts’ affirmative 
common law powers). 
164 See Gardner, supra note 24, at 809; see also O’Neill, supra note 27, at 579 (noting that state courts have no case in controversy 
requirement, meaning that they may issue binding advisory opinions compelling state legislatures to formulate remedies); Blanchard, 
supra note 33, at 273 (noting that state courts are generally more involved in creating public policy than federal courts). 
165 See Blanchard, supra note 33, at 273 (citing various reasons why greater authority for state supreme court justices would not 
threaten state separation of powers or democracy); Swenson, supra note 98, at 1152-53 (noting that many states have directly-elected 
justices). 
166 Blanchard, supra note 33, at 273-74; see also Swenson, supra note 98, at 1152-53 (discussing various appointment systems for 
state supreme court justices). 
167 State constitutions are re-written relatively often, and are generally easier to amend through state referendum. See Blanchard, supra 
note 33, at 273 (“[S]tate court opinions are more easily overruled by constitutional amendment.”). Article XIV of the Illinois State 
Constitution requires a referendum to be presented to voters every twenty years on whether a new constitutional convention should be 
convened. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
168 It is worth noting that Article II, Section 1 of the Illinois State Constitution specifically provides for the separation of state powers, 
yet neither the Edgar nor Lewis E. opinion makes any mention of it, instead deferring to Baker v. Carr. See ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1; 
Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 802-05 (Ill. 1999).  
169 See O’Neill, supra note 27, at 562 (discussing generally the Court’s past political question cases and noting that “[e]ducational 
adequacy cases are the only cases in which the Illinois Supreme Court has invoked the political question doctrine to preclude judicial 
review”). 
170 See People v. McWeeney, 102 N.E. 233, 238 (Ill. 1913); Daly v. Madison County, 38 N.E.2d 160, 167 (Ill. 1941); Donovan v. 
Holzman, 132 N.E.2d 501, 502, 506 (Ill. 1956); Kluk v. Lang, 531 N.E.2d 790, 791, 797 (Ill. 1988). In two early cases, People v. 
McWeeney (1913) and Daly v. Madison (1941), the court appeared to erect a clear barrier between the judiciary and any politically 
tinged issues. McWeeney involved a disputed injunctive order that would have barred one faction of the Democratic Committee of 
Cook County from attending an official party event. McWeeney, 102 N.E. at 234-35. Specifically, the court was reviewing the validity 
of the injunction because the rival party faction had been held in contempt of court for its violation. Id. In ruling that the injunction 
was impermissible, the court noted that the “courts cannot be drawn into political contests of any sort or description unless required by 
statute, and any injunction for the purpose of restraining or controlling acts of a political nature is void.” Id. at 238. The court 
maintained its strict prohibition on deciding political issues in Daly, a taxpayer suit that sought the enjoinment of the use of public 
funds to run an election. Daly, 38 N.E.2d at 162. The plaintiffs filed the suit because they believed the state’s failure to reapportion 
voting districts from 1901 to 1940 had diluted their voting strength. Id. Once again, the court found the issue to be political and thus 
outside of its authority. Id. at 164-65 (“A court of equity is prohibited from passing on any political question, and once it is determined 
that the controversy involves political and not civil or property rights, the court must refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The power to 
hold an election is political. A court of equity has no power to restrain officers in the exercise of that power.”). Critically, both of these 
cases involved judicial action that directly impaired the democratic process. In McWeeney, the court ruled invalid a lower court’s 
injunction—thus, it was not determining whether a party’s claim was justiciable. McWeeney, 102 N.E. at 237-38. The lower court’s 
injunction was invalid because it directly impaired democratic party members from attending an official party event related to primary 
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opened the door for judicial review of some types of cases involving constitutional judgment.
171
  
Decided just a few years before Baker, the Donovan court drew roughly the same conclusion as 
the United States Supreme Court—that there is a difference between “political questions” and 
“political cases.”172  The court believed that Donovan, involving a disputed reapportionment plan, 
was firmly in the latter category, merely requiring it to judge whether the legislature’s 
reapportionment effort was constitutional, rather than take the quasi-legislative action of 
formulating its own plan.
173
  Later, in Kluk v. Lang (1988), the court formally adopted the Baker 
test.
174
  Since Kluk, the Illinois Supreme Court has never dismissed a case under its political 
question doctrine—except for the education cases.175  
As discussed above, the court’s adherence to the doctrine is questionable; however, even 
under the Baker test the current court should be able to rule on education issues.
176
  Contrary to 
the Edgar court’s finding that it did not have the resources to judge educational adequacy, at the 
time there were several academic standards with which it could judge the relative educational 
equality of Illinois schools, including the Illinois Goal Assessment Program test, a state-level 
standardized academic assessment exam, national academic assessments such as the American 
College Testing (“ACT”) exam, and graduation, daily attendance, and drop-out rates.177  Since 
Edgar and Lewis E., the Illinois State Board of Education has also instituted two comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                                     
elections. Id. In Daly, the court refused to rule on the case because it found it had no power to halt an election. Daly, 38 N.E.2d at 163-
64. 
171 Donovan, 132 N.E.2d at 502-03. The Donovan plaintiff initiated a taxpayer suit seeking a declaratory judgment that reapportioned 
state senate and representative districts were constitutionally invalid. Id. The plaintiff’s prayer for relief was key—rather than ask the 
court to halt elections (as in Daly) or redraw districts themselves, he merely sought the court’s judgment on the constitutionality of the 
reapportionment. Id. 
172 See id. at 506 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)) (“The mere fact that political rights and questions are 
involved does not create immunity from judicial review.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
173 Donovan, 132 N.E.2d at 506. As the court emphasized:  
There is a vast difference between determining whether the principle of compactness of territory has been 
applied at all or not, and whether or not the nearest practical approximation to perfect compactness has been 
attained. The first is a question which the courts may finally determine; the latter is for the legislature.  
 
Id. Drawing this distinction was a matter of degree—there was no bright line between political questions and political cases—and 
could only be settled by examining the plaintiff’s complaint and the evidence in the record. Id. The legislation would be given a 
presumption of constitutionality, however the court would still conduct some degree of independent judicial review. Id. at 506-07. 
Although the court generally deferred to the legislative record, it did note that it had not been presented with “any other of the vast 
spectrum of factors that might militate against” laying out the districts as they had been drawn. Id. at 506. Presumably, if presented 
with other forms of evidence besides the legislative record, the court would have taken this into consideration. Id. Turning to the 
record, the court found nothing in the legislative record or in the contours of the districts themselves that suggested they had been 
drawn to favor specific populations or political groups. Id. The apportionment scheme was upheld. Id. at 507. 
174 Kluk, 531 N.E.2d at 797. The court also firmly reiterated its authority to judge the constitutionality of legislative action, even those 
involving political issues: 
We are of the opinion that a determination by a court that if an integral part of the legislative branch of 
government is permitted to proceed in a particular manner the result will be a deprivation of a constitutional 
right of an individual, does not constitute a lack of respect due a coordinate branch of the government, but it is 
an exercise of one of the duties committed to the judiciary.  
 
Id. at 796-97. 
175 O’Neill, supra note 27, at 562. 
176 In Edgar the court focused on the second prong of the Baker standard, that “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving” suggests an issue is a non-justiciable political question, and found it lacked standards for determining what 
constitutes a “high quality” education. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (“The constitution 
provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of high quality. It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever 
standards of quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense.”). 
177 See State Board of Education Approves Comprehensive Changes in System of Support for Academically Struggling Schools , ILL. 
STATE BOARD OF EDUC. (May 13, 2003), http://www.isbe.net/news/2003/may13a-03.htm [hereinafter Comprehensive Changes] 
(noting that the IGAP test was replaced by the Illinois Standards Achievement Test and Prairie State Achievement Test in 1999 and 
2001, respectively). The ACT has been in existence since 1959. See generally ACT: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1959—2009 (2009), 
available at http://media.act.org/documents/ACT_History.pdf. 
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state exams testing student achievement in core subject matters.
178
  The Illinois Standards 
Achievement Test (“ISAT”), administered in grades three through eight, tests students in math, 
reading, science, and writing.
179
  The Prairie State Achievement Exam (“PSAE”), taken each year 
by all eleventh grade students, is the high school equivalent to the ISAT.
180
  Scoring on these tests 
is weighed against statewide standards, allowing for comparison of one district to another, and 
results are readily accessible online.
181
  Furthermore, Illinois’ education funding system, which 
categorizes districts into “foundation,” “alternative,” and “flat grant” districts based on their local 
property wealth, provides for a convenient set of “district wealth” standards against which student 
performance may be compared.
182
   
 A brief examination of the remaining Baker standards further suggests education finance 
litigation does not raise a political question.  Without specific constitutional or statutory language 
to indicate otherwise, there is no reason to believe there is an “unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made” or “the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”183  Presumably, plaintiffs 
in future education litigation would again merely seek a declaration that the funding system is 
unconstitutional, fully allowing the state legislature to formulate a new system without judicial 
interference.
184
  Moreover, there is nothing in the text of Article X, Section 1 to suggest a need for 
exceptional judicial deference.
185
  The same basic reasoning also indicates the Illinois Supreme 
Court would not have to make an “initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial 
discretion.”186  Additionally, a judicial decision on the constitutionality of a piece of legislation 
would not show a “lack of respect due [to the] coordinate branches of government”—weighing 
the constitutionality of law is, after all, a primary function of the court.
187
  Finally, there is no 
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
                                                        
178 See Comprehensive Changes, supra note 177. The tests are components of the Adequate Yearly Progress benchmarks required 
under No Child Left Behind, the major federal education reform legislation. No Child Left Behind/Annual Yearly Progress: 
Frequently Asked Questions, ILL. STATE BOARD OF EDUC., http://www.isbe.net/ayp/htmls/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). See 
generally Elementary and Secondary Education Act, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/esea (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (for 
background information on NCLB). 
179 Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT), ILL. INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, http://iirc.niu.edu/Tests.aspx?isat (last updated Oct. 
25, 2013) [hereinafter ISAT]; see Student Assessment Illinois, supra note 14. The ISAT measures individual student achievement 
relative to the statewide learning standards developed by the Illinois State Board of Education (“ISBE”), evaluating students by 
subject according to four performance levels: exceeds standards, meets standards, below standards, and academic warning. See ISAT, 
supra; Student Assessment Illinois, supra note 14. 
180 Prairie State Achievement Exam (PSAE), ILL. INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, http://iirc.niu.edu/Tests.aspx?psae (last updated Oct. 
25, 2013) [hereinafter PSAE]; see also Student Assessment Prairie State, supra note 14. The PSAE evaluates students based on their 
ACT scores (all students in Illinois are required to take the ACT during the first day of the two-day PSAE), a science assessment 
developed by the Illinois State Board of Education, and additional reading and math exams developed by the ACT corporation. Id. 
181 See ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, supra note 8 (providing an interactive internet application for users to view and 
compare test scores, district financial information, and many other key educational metrics); 2013 Illinois School Report Cards, CHI. 
TRIB., http://schools.chicagotribune.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
182 See supra Part III-A (explaining Illinois’ school funding system). 
183 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (note that there is no language that could reasonably be read to 
suggest that the Court must avoid education issues). 
184 Indeed, recent litigation before the Illinois Supreme Court did seek declaratory judgment. See Complaint, supra note 30, at 15; 
Public Education—School Funding Litigation, BUS. & PROF. PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INT., http://www.bpichicago.org/pe_litigation.php 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Public Education—School Funding Litigation] (providing additional information about the 
suit). Given the Illinois Supreme Court’s extreme reluctance in Edgar to substantively critique or amend the state’s education funding 
system, it seems unlikely the court would be willing to do anything more than simply strike down the funding system as 
unconstitutional. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1192 (Ill. 1996) (“[W]e will not under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation, presume to lay down guidelines or ultimatums for [the legislature].” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
185 ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
186 Id. Like the Donovan court’s assessment of political districts, the court would be making a judgment of the constitutionality of the 
funding system in general (as a finance system predicated on local property wealth), and not an assessment of the specific mechanics 
of the scheme. See Donovan v. Holzman, 132 N.E.2d 501, 506 (Ill. 1956). 
187 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (granting the Illinois Supreme Court final appellate jurisdiction over questions 
of law decided in lower courts). 
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department.”188  The Illinois Supreme Court is thus fully capable of ruling on the constitutionality 
of the state’s education funding system, and should not dismiss future cases as nonjusticiable 
political questions.  
B. Fundamental Rights and the Article X Education Clause Promise of a Minimally Adequate 
Education 
Once a plaintiff surmounts the “political question hurdle” erected by Edgar and Lewis E., 
he will have to persuade the court that it should apply strict scrutiny review to the funding system 
because it infringes on a fundamental right promised by the Illinois state constitution.
189
  
Otherwise, the court will apply a highly deferential rational basis review that grants the funding 
scheme a strong presumption of constitutionality.
190
  This Part will thus examine the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s refusal to find a fundamental right to education within the Illinois 
Constitution.
191
   
 The plaintiffs in both Edgar and Lewis E. essentially made two distinct fundamental right 
arguments, one based on equal protection/due process principals, and one based on Article X, 
Section 1 of the Illinois State Constitution.
192
  In both cases, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ equal protection/due process complaints by strictly adhering to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Rodriguez.193  Much like its application of the federal political question doctrine, 
the Illinois Supreme Court’s lockstep adherence to Rodriguez appears unfounded.194  State court 
constitutions and high courts are fundamentally different than their federal counterparts, unbound 
by the strict contours of the Federal Constitution.
195
  As such, state courts have considerably 
greater power to expand on personal rights and liberties than federal courts, and should not 
necessarily adhere to federal precedent.
196
  Furthermore, the presence of a dedicated educational 
article in the Illinois State Constitution at least suggests a stronger entitlement to education than 
does the Federal Constitution, which is wholly silent on the matter.
197
 
                                                        
188 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. During its analysis of the 1970 Constitutional Convention record, the Edgar court found that the education 
article was meant to delegate exclusive responsibility for the education system to the state legislature. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1190. This 
is despite the fact that delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention specifically replaced the phrase “General Assembly” with “the 
state” when it rewrote the constitution’s education article. Id. The majority opinion in Edgar glosses over this point, essentially stating 
that because education issues are a matter for the legislature only, the change in wording could not have expanded responsibility for 
public education to all three branches of the state government. Id. (“Surely, however, this provision does not alter the roles or expand 
the powers assigned to the different branches of government by the constitution. Courts may not legislate in the field of public 
education any more than they may legislate in any other area.”). The court’s circular logic does not provide a meaningful answer to the 
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” prong of the Baker standard, and seems to ignore contrary proof within the 
constitutional convention record. See id. at 1200-02 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that, based on the 
constitutional convention record, the 1970 delegates’ use of the phrase “the state” was a deliberate delegation of responsibility to all 
three branches of the Illinois state government.). 
189 This Article will ignore arguments that the funding system discriminates against a suspect class (such as the poor or racial/ethnic 
minorities). Suspect class arguments have generally been unsuccessful in other states. See supra Part II (discussing the shift towards 
education clause “adequacy” claims following Rodriguez). Additionally, suspect class arguments did not factor significantly into 
either the Edgar or Lewis E. decisionvs. See supra Part III-C (summarizing the plaintiffs’ arguments in Edgar and Lewis E. as well as 
the court’s analysis). 
190 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1180-96 (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to the court’s review of the Illinois education funding system, 
and in turn upholding it under rational basis review); see also supra Part III-C (summarizing the Edgar decision). Although, as will be 
shown in Part IV-C, plaintiffs may be able to make a strong case against the funding serving even a rational basis. See infra Part IV-C. 
191 See infra Part IV-B (analyzing the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention record and what it suggests about the meaning of Article 
X). 
192 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1182; Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 801, 812 (Ill. 1999). 
193 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1193-94; Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 805. 
194 See supra Part IV-A (discussing differences in state and federal courts and why the federal legal doctrines should not necessarily be 
applied in state constitutional cases). 
195 See Brennan, supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
196 Id. 
197 See Banchard, supra note 33, at 256 (“Ascribing ‘nonfundamental’ status to educational rights in spite of express education clauses 
in the state constitutions indicates reluctance on the part of courts to serve as protectors of political minority interests.”). 
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 Finding clearly defined education rights within Article X of the Illinois Constitution, 
however, may be difficult.  In Edgar, the plaintiff’s Article X claim made two separate 
arguments: 1) an “efficient” system of education required substantial equality in funding between 
districts; and 2) the article’s promise of a “high quality” education guaranteed some minimum 
level of quality.
198
  For the first time, the Illinois Supreme Court conducted a substantial 
interpretation of Article X, Section 1.
199
  The court’s subsequent reading appears to be largely—
but not wholly—correct.200  
A 1975 report on the 1970 Convention Education Committee, which included post-
convention interviews with many of the delegates, confirms much of the Edgar court’s 
analysis.
201
  The use of the word “efficient” in the 1870 education article had been read by Illinois 
courts to mean that school district boundaries had to be drawn so as not to exclude or severely 
inconvenience students.
202
  With little debate, the 1970 delegates agreed that the use of efficient in 
their revision would simply retain the legal precedent developed since 1870, and did not mean 
equal funding.
203
  More critically, the Edgar court correctly determined Article X’s final line, a 
promise that “the State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public 
education,” is only a non-binding proclamation and does not require the majority of school 
funding to come from state funds (as oppose to local property tax revenue).
204
  The 1970 
Convention rejected two different amendments to Article X that would have required the state to 
provide the majority of funding for public schools as well as limit total contributions to school 
funding from local property taxes.
205
  Subsequently, the Convention settled on Article X’s present 
language, explicitly proposed as a mere “hortatory” statement of intent.206 
Still, other elements of Article X remained undefined in the Edgar court’s analysis and 
may provide a guarantee of some minimal level of education.
207
  Most notably, the use of the 
phrase “high-quality,” dismissed by the Edgar and Lewis E. courts under their political question 
analysis, was never clearly defined during the 1970 Convention and only briefly debated.
208
  
                                                        
198 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1183. The Lewis E. plaintiffs, although attempting to distinguish their case from Edgar, essentially made the 
same argument regarding the use of “high quality” in the article—that it guaranteed some minimally adequate level of education. 
Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 802. 
199 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1186-87. 
200 Compare id. at 1185 (“The framers of the 1970 Constitution embraced this limited construction that the constitutional efficiency 
requirement authorized judicial review of school district boundaries.”), with BURESH, supra note 2, at 84 (explaining that the 1970 
Convention education committee intended the promise of an “efficient” education system to retain the meaning originally assigned to 
it under the 1870 constitution, just as the Edgar court had read the provision). 
201 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 84.  
202 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1185 (“Under the 1870 Constitution, this court consistently held that the question of the efficiency and 
thoroughness of the school system was one solely for the legislature to answer . . . However, under a limited exception to this principle 
it was held that pursuant to the ‘thorough and efficient’ requirement school district boundaries must be established so that the districts 
are compact and contiguous.”). 
203 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 84 (stating that the 1970 Convention education committee believed that “efficient” would incorporate 
the meaning originally assigned in the 1870 article). 
204 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1187 (describing Article X’s final line as a “purely hortatory statement of principle”). 
205 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 84-86, 114-18 (summarizing the debate over Article X’s final sentence). 
206 See id. After proposing the language eventually included in Article X, Delegate Dawn Netsch noted that “while [Article X’s final 
sentence] is not legally enforceable, I hope that it will function as a conscience to the General Assembly to assume a greater 
proportion of the financing of the public schools of the state.” Id. at 114. 
207 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 126 (discussing the ultimate intent of the delegates in re-writing Article X); infra Part III-C 
(summarizing the Edgar opinion). 
208 See RECORD OF PROCEEDINNGS, supra note 1, at 767. Conversation regarding the meaning and intent of “high quality” was largely 
limited to the following: 
 
MR. GARRISON: Mr. President, I would like to direct attention to line 6 of section 1, where the term, “high-quality public 
educational institutions and services,” is used. 
 
It is my understanding that the word “quality” is—in relation to education—is a much debated concept and that there have 
been commissions which have given a great deal of study to it. 
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Although the delegates appear to suggest the legislature should ultimately define the meaning of 
“high quality,” delegate Kamin’s statement during the debate at least implies that “high quality” 
is supposed to mean something more than adequate.
209
  If a plaintiff can successfully persuade the 
court to abandon its application of the political question doctrine, it would remove entirely the 
Edgar court’s justification for not finding in “high quality” some guaranteed level of education.210  
Additionally, statements made by delegate Kamin after the 1970 Convention shed 
additional light on how the education committee understood the impact of the new Article X, as 
well as the ultimate goal the delegates pursued in the process: 
If the Illinois school financing system is further challenged in the courts, the new 
equal protection clause in the Illinois Bill of Rights, together with the “efficient 
system” language of the Educational Article, should compel a Serrano-like result 
. . . Hopefully, such a case will not be necessary. If the legislature and the new 
State Board of Education will take the school financing language for what it is—
the statement of a pressing problem and the urgent prayer for a fair solution—
then they will act to equalize educational opportunity and the tax burdens of 
educational financing without further judicial intervention.
211
 
 
 As some have suggested, the delegates’ intent and the full meaning of Article X cannot 
be clearly discerned from the Convention’s record.212  The Edgar court was correct in concluding 
that Article X makes no guarantee of equal education funding districts, nor does it compel the 
state to shift to a more centralized funding system.
213
  Still, the court’s failure to sufficiently 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Did the committee come to any definite definition or conclusion as to what would constitute quality services with respect 
to education? 
 
MR. FOGAL: No, we—the word “quality,” I suppose, means different things to different people. We had in mind the 
highest, the most excellent educational system possible; leave this up to the determination of the legislature and your local 
districts, and let the citizens keep pushing for higher-quality education. We didn’t attempt to define all of the ramifications 
of high quality. 
 
MR. PATCH: But there was strong deliberation on the fact that if you just left it at quality, it could be low quality, medium 
quality; we wanted the highest form of quality that can be obtained by any system. 
 
MR. GARRISON: Would it be possible to have a system higher and the high quality that you provide for—for example, a 
superior education? 
 
MR. PATCH: Well, I don’t know—it might be, but I wouldn’t knock it.  
 
And then later: 
 
MR. KAMIN: I would also like to, if I could, address myself to Mr. Garrison. The use of the word “high quality” is a play 
on the use of the word “good” which is in the present article [the 1870 educational article]. The committee felt that there 
was not any more specific a definition perhaps for “high quality” than there was for “good,” but at least “good” is a lower 
term; “high quality” is a term which is going in the direction in which we want to go. 
 
Id. 
209 Id. 
210 See supra Part III-C (summarizing the Court’s justification for not finding “high quality” to guaranty some minimum level of 
educational quality). 
211 Malcolm S. Kamin, The School Finance Language of the Education Article: The Chimerical Mandate, 6 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & 
PROC. 331, 345 (1973); see BURESH, supra note 2, at 126. 
212 See Wilson & Wilson, supra note 148 (“The transcripts of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, however, reveal neither an 
intent to require fiscal neutrality nor a desire to dismiss equality of educational funding altogether.  Instead, the convention's debates 
on education were full of confusing turns and contradictory aims: The delegates generally desired more equality of educational 
opportunities, but they generally rejected any specific measure which could achieve it.”). 
213 See supra Part III-C (summarizing the Edgar court’s analysis of Article X). 
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consider the meaning of “high quality” leaves open the possibility of adequacy claims.214  Given 
these ambiguities, future challenges to Illinois education funding system should continue to make 
adequacy claims based on Article X.
215
 
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Should Not Defer to “Local Control” of Public Schools 
The final impediment to education finance reform is the public policy preference for 
“local control,” the idea that communities, parents, and local school boards should have 
maximum say in the operations of schools.
216
  In Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court, after 
determining that rational basis review was most appropriate for judging Texas’ funding system, 
found local control to be a legitimate state interest rationally served by the financing scheme.
217
  
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court in Edgar deferred to the concept of local control after 
refusing to find a suspect class or fundamental right to education harmed by Illinois’ funding 
scheme.
218
  The court’s deference is misguided.  There is nothing constitutionally binding the 
court to the idea of local control, and the very idea of local control is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant as state and national changes impact the fundamental operation of public education in 
Illinois. 
  Despite strong judicial deference to local control, there is nothing in either the United 
States Constitution or Illinois State Constitution immunizing the concept from the reach of the 
judiciary.
219
  Local control is primarily manifested in Illinois through the existence of local school 
boards, entities entirely defined by statute.
220
  Illinois’ local school boards have broad authority 
under the Illinois School Code to hire and fire teachers, manage school curriculum, and contract, 
however, the scope of their powers (and limitations) is enumerated by the state.
221
  Given that 
local control is simply a policy choice established by statute, and that state courts often take on a 
greater role in setting public policy, the Illinois Supreme Court’s deference to this concept is 
questionable.
222
 
 Moreover, it is hard to argue that school districts and local school boards actually have 
meaningful control over school funding.
223
  As Justice White’s dissent in Rodriguez forcefully 
illustrates, property tax-based funding systems are quite unresponsive to the will of the locality.
224
  
Like all districts, property-poor districts are free to tax at a higher rate than the statutorily 
prescribed minimum; however, they may only be able to generate a fraction of what wealthier 
districts can raise, even at tax rates several times that of wealthy districts.
225
  Moreover, even if 
                                                        
214 See supra Part III-C. 
215 See infra Part V (proposing that future education finance litigants may be able to successfully challenge the state’s education 
funding system). 
216 See Blanchard, supra note 33, at 279 (providing a general overview of the local control concept); Faber, supra note 57 (describing 
local control of schools as a devolution of management control from the state to local school boards). 
217 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44, 49 (1973); see also supra Part II (summarizing the Rodriguez opinion). 
218 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193, 1195-96 (Ill. 1996); see also supra Part III-C (summarizing the Edgar 
opinion). 
219 See U.S. CONST.; ILL. CONST. 
220 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-1 to 10-22.19 (West 2013); see Faber, supra note 57 (“Legally, these local school districts are 
agents of the state, created in accordance with state law for the purpose of implementing the state's responsibility.”). 
221 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-1 to 10-22.19. 
222 See Blanchard, supra note 33, at 273 (stating that, because state courts can issue binding advisory opinions, they are more involved 
in setting public policy than federal courts bound by case in controversy requirements).  
223 See id. at 281 (arguing that property tax-based school funding systems do not provide local control of schools for poor districts). 
See generally Eric P. Christofferson, Note, Rodriguez Reexamined: The Misonomer of “Local Control” and a Constitutional Case for 
Equitable Public School Funding, 90 GEO. L.J. 2553, 2575-76 (2002) (arguing against the use of local control to justify maintaining 
property tax-based funding systems). 
224 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63-70 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (explaining in detail how plaintiff’s 
school district, despite its willingness to tax at a higher rate to achieve greater school funding, is circumstantially and statutorily 
prevented from actually achieving school funding levels anywhere close to wealthier neighboring districts). 
225 To illustrate using two of the districts referenced in the introduction to this Article, in 2012 Northbrook School District 28 had an 
equalized assessed property (“EAV”) value of  $977,894 per student, and taxed at a rate $1.89 per $100 EAV. ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE 
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property poor districts have the political will and popular support to tax at any rate necessary to 
match wealthier districts, Illinois sets a maximum rate at which districts may tax.
226
  Wealthy 
school districts are then free to set rates much lower than poor districts and still generate much 
greater revenues.  This greater revenue subsequently allows wealthy districts to gain more 
experienced teachers, classroom technology, smaller class sizes, and newer school facilities.
227
  
Moreover, the Illinois School Code permits the State Board of Education to assume temporary 
fiscal control over financially-challenged districts, further eroding the notion that current laws 
provide any meaningful financial autonomy, and thus local control, to school districts.
228
 
 Local control, of course, also refers to other areas of educational planning, including 
setting curriculums, staffing schools, and managing school facilities.
229
  Here too, more recent 
changes in education policy have significantly reduced the amount of local control districts are 
able to excercise over day-to-day operations.
230
  As part of the state’s application for funding 
under the U.S. Department of Education’s Race to the Top program,231 the Illinois state 
legislature passed the Performance Evaluation Reform Act (“PERA”) in 2010, increasing state 
control over how teachers are evaluated, tenured, and dismissed.
232
  Under PERA, school districts 
reviewing teacher performance must incorporate the use of data on student growth, based on state 
guidelines, as a significant factor in rating teaching performance.
233
  In June 2011, Governor Pat 
Quinn signed into law Public Act 97-8 (commonly referred as “Senate Bill 7”), expanding the use 
                                                                                                                                                                     
REPORT CARD, supra note 8. As a result, the district was able to spend $11,332 per pupil. Id. In contrast, Calumet Public School 
District 132 had an EAV of just $124,755 per student, but taxed at a rate of $3.46 per $100 EAV. Id. It was able to spend just $5,007 
per pupil. Id. East St. Louis School District 189, a high school district, may offer the most extreme example. With an EAV of just 
$17,010, the district taxes at $7.49 per $100 EAV but can spend just $8,104 per student (in contrast, Niles High School District 219 
has an EAV of $1,139,709, taxes at $2.27 per $100, and spends $12,667 per student). Id. Although this inverse relationship between 
property wealth and tax rate does not always hold true, it is common throughout Illinois. See also Secter, supra note 2 (“Rich districts 
can raise more money through property taxes, and yet individual taxpayers in those districts don't shell out nearly as much as a 
percentage of their income as taxpayers in less prosperous places.”). 
226 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-2; see supra Part III-A. In Rodriguez, the Texas funding system also set a maximum tax rate for 
districts. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 67. 
227 See Blanchard, supra note 33, at 281 (“Local fiscal responsibility translates into paralysis rather than autonomy if the district in 
question happens to be too poor to provide meaningful choice. Innovations that may result from local experimentation will likely only 
be available to districts that can afford them. . . . [O]nly the wealthiest districts will be in a position to pioneer improvements in 
education, and should any beneficial innovations occur that require funding, only the wealthiest districts will be able to take advantage 
and implement them.”); see supra Part I and infra Part V-A (discussing how funding disparities impair the performance of poorer 
schools and low-income students, and how increasing funding can help improve performance). 
228 See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1A-8 (dictating the powers of the Illinois State Board of Education to assume control of districts 
deemed to be in financial difficulties). 
229 See Blanchard, supra note 33, at 279 (discussing broadly the tenets of local control); see also BURESH, supra note 2, at 79 (quoting 
a delegate from the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention as stating that the areas most connected with local control in Illinois—
teachers, administration, curriculum, and requirements of local school districts—would be unaffected by revisions made in the new 
education article). 
230 The plaintiffs in Carr v. Koch similarly argued that changes in education policy have effectively limited local control; however, the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s dismissal of the case for lack of standing left the issue largely unaddressed. See Carr v. Koch, 981 N.E.2d 
326, 331-36 (Ill. 2012). 
231 Part of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act—the “stimulus”—the Race to the Top program is a $4.35 billion 
competitive grant program that awards money to states enacting various education reforms.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP 
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.  See 
generally Race to the Top Fund, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html (last updated Jun. 7, 
2013) (providing background information on the Race to the Top program). According to the Department of Education, the program 
“encourage[s] and reward[s] States that are creating the conditions for education innovation and reform; achieving significant 
improvement in student outcomes . . . closing achievement gaps, improving high school graduation rates, and ensuring student 
preparation for success in college and careers.” Id.  
232 2009 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 96-861 (S.B. 315) (West) (codified at 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-1 to 24A-20). 
233 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-4(b). Although school districts will technically be able to formulate their own evaluation 
criteria, the districts must meet certain minimum standards set by the state Performance Evaluation Advisory Council. Id. 
Furthermore, if a district’s evaluation reform committee fails to develop adequate evaluation criteria after 180 days, the district must 
implement the state’s model evaluation criteria. Id.; see Performance Evaluation Advisory Council (PEAC), ILLINOIS STATE BOARD 
OF EDUC., http://www.isbe.net/peac/html/overview.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2011). 
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of student test scores by tying results more closely with teacher tenure and dismissal 
procedures.
234
  Under Senate Bill 7, seniority—the length of time a teacher has taught at a given 
school district—is now equally weighed against all other factors (such as teacher evaluations and 
other merit-based factors) when districts make employment decisions.
235
   
 The state has taken control over other areas of local education policy.
236
  Districts with 
schools that fail to meet Adequate Yearly Progress benchmarks under No Child Left Behind must 
formulate school improvement plans subject to approval by the Illinois State Board of Education, 
and may also be monitored and assessed by the State Board.
237
  The Board also requires all school 
children to meet certain annual curriculum goals, and districts to administer statewide 
standardized tests.
238
  All Illinois public schools are obligated to provide special education 
services pursuant to state and federal standards under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, the primary piece of federal legislation addressing education for disabled students.
239
  
Finally, the push for charter schools in some of the state’s poorest neighborhoods has ceded local 
control not to the state, but to private nonprofit and for-profit organizations.
240
  Local control is 
thus no longer a relevant, legitimate basis for Illinois courts to avoid striking down the current 
education funding system, and should be attacked by future plaintiffs.  
 
V. PROPOSAL 
 
Forty-three years after 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, the Illinois state 
legislature has failed to answer Article X’s “urgent prayer for a fair solution” to education 
                                                        
234 2011 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 97-8 (S.B. 7) (West) (codified in scattered sections of 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5). Under Senate Bill 
Seven, teachers can only achieve tenure by receiving several consecutive positive performance evaluations. Id.; see also HODGES, 
LOIZZI, EISENHAMMER, RODICK & KOHN LLP, EDUCATION REFORM SIGNED INTO LAW 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.hlerk.com/pdf/SB7.pdf (summarizing changes made in Senate Bill Seven). 
235 2011 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 97-8 (S.B. 7) (West). Senate Bill Seven requires districts to group teachers into various categories based 
on their most recent performance evaluation. Id. In the event of reductions in force, districts must dismiss teachers based on these 
categories starting with the lowest rated teachers. Id.; see also HODGES, LOIZZI, EISENHAMMER, RODICK & KOHN LLP, supra note 234 
(summarizing changes made in Senate Bill Seven). None of this is to say that performance-based evaluations are poor education 
policy; rather, these laws merely illustrate that the traditional concept of local control has significantly diminished in the current push 
for educational reforms. 
236 See Complaint, supra note 30; see also Public Education—School Funding Litigation, supra note 184 (providing additional 
information about the suit). 
237 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3.25d; see No Child Left Behind / Adequate Yearly Progress, ILL. STATE BOARD OF EDUC., 
http://www.isbe.state.il.us/ayp/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
238 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3.64; see also supra Part IV-A (discussing the implementation of the ISAT and PSAE standardized 
tests in Illinois schools). 
239 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1.01. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, schools have an affirmative duty to 
identify children requiring special education services, develop individualized education plans designed to meet the unique needs of 
each special education student, and conduct regular monitoring and evaluation of student performance. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
23, § 226.50 (2013) (“A free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) as defined at 34 CFR 300.17, must be made available by school 
districts to children with disabilities in accordance with 34 CFR 300.101 through 300.103.”); Id. § 226.100 (“Each school district shall 
be responsible for actively seeking out and identifying all children . . . within the district . . . who may be eligible for special education 
and related services.”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.131 (2013) (“Each [Local Education Agency] must locate, identify, and evaluate all children 
with disabilities who are enrolled by their parents in private, including religious, elementary schools and secondary schools located in 
the school district….”). See generally Building the Legacy: IDEA 2004, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUC., http://idea.ed.gov/explore/home 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (providing information on IDEA); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 
(IDEA), ILL.STATE BOARD OF EDUC., http://www.isbe.net/spec-ed/html/idea.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (providing information 
of IDEA’s implementation in Illinois public schools). 
240 See generally Catalyst In Brief: Chicago’s Charter Schools, CATALYST CHI. (Community Renewal Soc’y), Feb. 2010, available at 
http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/assets/assets/extra/InBrief-Charters-Feb10.pdf (providing an explanation of charter schools). Chicago 
International Charter Schools, for example, utilizes a mix of non-profit and for-profit educational management organizations to 
oversee its thirteen Chicago campuses. Id. Although charter schools in Illinois are subject to periodic state review, they are exempt 
from many of the reporting requirements public schools must follow. Id. 
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funding inequality.
241
  Instead, the state’s public schools have faced perpetual funding crises242 
and chronic disparities in educational spending between districts.
243
  Sweeping local remedies 
have had little success in improving educational equality, and popular national reform policies—
particularly the push for charter schools—have had mixed results.244  Further, recent state budget 
deficits have only further strained public schools.
245
  
Even so, true public education finance reform in Illinois remains elusive due to its 
political sensitivity.
246
  The quality of local schools plays a fundamental role in how Americans 
select communities to live in and is intimately related to housing prices.
247
  Moreover, there has 
long been a political divide between urban, suburban, and rural state representatives, each of 
                                                        
241 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 126 (noting that Article X was intended by the 1970 Convention delegates to be an “urgent prayer” to 
reform the state’s school funding system); Secter, supra note 2 (noting the failure of the Illinois legislature to pass meaningful funding 
reforms); Wilson & Wilson, supra note 148 (noting that the 1970 Convention delegates’ plea for funding reform has gone 
unanswered); supra Part III-B (discussing the failed effort to amend Article X in 1992). 
242 See Secter, supra note 2 (stating that Illinois schools have “lurched” from one funding crisis to the next); Malone & Long, supra 
note 3 (discussing cuts to education funding in the current state budget, as well as outstanding debts owed to school districts). 
243 See supra Part III-A (explaining how the current public education funding system produces large disparities in per-pupil spending 
in different districts). 
244 Approximately 2.3 million American school children attend about 6,000 charter schools across the country during the 2012-13 
school year, a figure that has increased by 80% since 2009. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, STAN. U., NATIONAL 
CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 2013 1 (2013) [hereinafter NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 2013], available at 
https://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%20Final%20Draft.pdf. The efficacy of charter schools as compared to 
traditional public schools remains inconclusive. See Stephanie Banchero, Daley School Plan Fails to Make Grade, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 17, 
2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-01-17/news/1001160276_1_charter-schools-chicago-reform-urban-education 
(discussing the failure of Renaissance 2010, former Chicago Mayor Richard Daley’s signature education reform initiative, to improve 
academic performance and test scores in Chicago Public Schools). In a 2009 study of 2,403 charter schools in fifteen states and the 
District of Columbia, researchers found that only 17% of charter schools outperformed their local public school alternative in math 
achievement goals, while 46% performed about the same as their counterpart public school, and 37% performed worse than their 
counterpart school. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, STAN. U., MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 
STATES 3 (Jun. 2009) [hereinafter MULTIPLE CHOICE], available at 
http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf. Although the Center for Research on Education Outcomes 
found improvements in charter performance in a follow-up study published in 2013, the Center nonetheless noted “charter school 
quality is uneven across the states and across schools.” See NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 2013, supra, at 3. The follow-up 
study found charters outperformed traditional public schools in 16 of 27 states studied with regard to reading learning gains, but only 
12 of 27 states with regard to math gains. Id. at 52. 
245 See Malone & Long, supra note 3 (discussing cuts to education funding in a recent state budget); Garcia & Pearson, supra note 3 
(further discussing levels of education spending in the state). 
246 See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Ill. 1996) (describing education finance as a “sensitive and 
controversial” topic); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 56-59 (1973) (noting the complexity of education 
finance issues and the lack of consensus over what reforms should be pursued); supra text accompanying note 104 (discussing the 
bitter debate over the proposed 1992 amendment to Article X). A central concern, recognized even by delegates to the 1970 
Convention, is that altering the current funding system will divert funds away from wealthy, academically successful schools and 
towards the poorest, least successful schools, resulting in the wealthy schools performing worse but not significantly improving the 
poorest schools. See BURESH, supra note 2, at 102 (noting that a minority of the 1970 education committee feared that reforming the 
funding system would result in a system where “all school districts would be reduced to the level of mediocrity rather than raised to 
greater heights”); see also Secter, supra note 2 (noting the political apathy Illinois voters have felt towards increasing funding in 
districts outside of their own). 
247 Although home prices have fallen in most communities over the past several years, homes in communities with high-performing 
schools have retained much more of their value than those in neighboring communities. Sarah Max, Good Schools, Bad Real Estate, 
WALL ST. J. (Jun. 25, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704009804575308951902854896.html. With the advent 
of easily-accessible state test scores and independent school rating websites, local school quality now factors even more greatly into 
home buying decisions. Id. Not surprisingly, the impact of school quality results in a “snowballing” effect that helps continue to 
improve wealthy schools districts while continuing to diminish funding for poor districts. Id. In some wealthy school districts, 
residents view local schools as an investment and tend to approve higher tax rates for schools. Id. This in turn drives up funding for 
local schools, and when these schools improve in academic performance, this tends to drive up home prices, further increasing the tax 
base. Id. Conversely, neighborhoods with worse schools tend to see greater decreases in residential property values, shrinking the 
overall tax base for local schools. Id. 
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whom serve very different constituencies and school districts with very different economic 
needs.
248
  
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, the path to education 
finance reform has run not through state legislatures, but rather through state supreme courts.
249
  
In twenty-seven states, challenges to property tax-based financing systems have been successful, 
and new cases continue to be litigated.
250
  The Illinois Supreme Court’s rulings in Edgar and 
Lewis E., however, firmly placed the court within a small minority that have refused to hear 
education litigation due to the court’s belief that such questions are political and thus not 
justiciable.
251
  Despite the barrier to future litigation ostensibly erected by these cases, plaintiffs 
should continue to challenge the state’s unjust funding system and the court’s questionable 
education funding jurisprudence.  
This Part will first examine how increasing education funding can help improve student 
performance.  Next, it will discuss the importance of building statewide political consensus 
before future plaintiffs initiate litigation.  This Part will then argue that the Illinois Supreme Court 
should hear future litigation cases on the merits, and should find a guarantee of a minimally 
adequate education level in the Illinois state constitution’s education article.  Finally, this Part 
will urge the Illinois state legislature to recognize that a truly effective education funding system 
requires consideration of each district’s individual needs rather than a system that simply 
equalizes funding for districts across the board. 
A. Increasing Education Funding Improves Academic Performance in Public Schools 
Before discussing the path forward for future litigants, it is worth examining whether 
increased education funding does, in fact, improve educational performance.
252
  Perhaps 
surprisingly, researchers have only recently attempted to analyze the relationship between 
education spending and student achievement.
253
  Moreover, studies examining this relationship 
are inherently difficult to design and often suffer from a lack of useful data.
254
  Even so, studies 
published in the last fifteen years suggest that increasing education funding can have a 
                                                        
248 See Secter, supra note 2 (noting Illinois voters’ and representatives’ unwillingness to increase funding for districts other than their 
own); supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the political divide between urban, suburban, and rural state representatives 
over the proposed 1992 amendment to Article X of the Illinois State Constitution). 
249 See generally Brooker, supra note 39 (summarizing state-level education funding reform litigation post-Rodriguez); NAT’L EDUC. 
ACCESS NETWORK, http://schoolfunding.info/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (providing information on school funding litigation across 
the country). 
250 See NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, supra note 249 (summarizing litigation results across the United States). 
251 See O’Neill, supra note 27, at 560-61 (noting that seven states, including Illinois, have dismissed education funding cases based on 
the state’s political question doctrine). For examples of education funding cases in other states that have also refused to decide cases 
on the merits because due to nonjusticiability, see Nebraska Coalition for Education Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 
164, 182-83 (Neb. 2007) and City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-59 (R.I. 1995). 
252 In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court questioned whether reforming school funding would actually benefit children in 
poor districts. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 56-59 (1973) (“The complexity of these problems is 
demonstrated by the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be said with any assurance that the poor, the racial minorities, or 
the children in over-burdened core-city school districts would be benefited by abrogation of traditional modes of financing 
education.”). 
253 See Dennis J. Condron & Vincent J. Roscigno, Disparities Within: Unequal Spending and Achievement in an Urban School 
District, 76 SOC. EDUCATION 18, 32 (2003) (“The analysis of the link between spending and achievement at the school level is in its 
infancy.”); David Card & A. Abigail Payne, School Finance Reform, the Distribution of School Spending, and the Distribution of 
Student Test Scores, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 49, 68 (2002) (noting that at the time of their study, there was “relatively little direct evidence 
linking school finance reforms to student outcomes” and that “research on the generic effects of school spending is controversial”). 
254 Student performance may be influenced by a number of variables, and education funding disparities may manifest themselves in 
different ways at different schools, including differences in teacher education, quality of facilities and instructional material, and the 
talent of district administrators. See Condron & Roscigno, supra note 253, at 21. Many studies to date have focused on district-level 
measures of education spending and student performance, yet spending between schools within the same district is itself often 
unequal. See id. at 20 (noting that variations in spending between schools within the same district can make studies examining school 
funding and student academic performance unreliable). Moreover, the availability of school-level spending and academic achievement 
data varies from state to state, making large-scale studies difficult. See id.  
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meaningful, tangible impact on student performance.
255
  One 2002 study examining the impact of 
school funding litigation found that, in twelve states where judicial invalidation of the education 
funding system resulted in an increase in funding for poorer districts, Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(“SAT”) test scores increased by about five percent.256  A 2003 study examining the impact of 
funding differences between elementary schools within the same district found that schools that 
spent more money per pupil generally had more highly educated teachers and better-maintained 
facilities.
257
  Consequently, students at schools that spent more per pupil outperformed students at 
poorer schools within the district on state academic assessment tests.
258
  The study’s authors 
found that a $1,000 increase in educational spending correlated to a 6 to 10% increase in the 
number of students at a school passing the state assessment tests.
259
  
In Illinois schools, a 2008 study also suggested that increasing student funding 
corresponds to improved test scores.
260
  Notably, the analysis first looked at data only from 
districts with less than 8% of students below the poverty line.
261
  This was done to help control 
for external valuables that often impact poorer students, such as lack of parental support or 
reinforcement of education in the household.
262
  An analysis of student performance on the ISAT 
versus per-pupil instruction spending suggested performance improved with each additional 
$1,000-2,200 spent per-pupil.
263
  A similar analysis was also conducted using data from schools 
with 27 to 32% of their student population in poverty, and found a similar correlation between 
spending and performance.
264
  
A comparison of per-pupil expenditure in Cook County school districts versus 
performance on various standardized tests also seems to suggest a general correlation.  The 
following charts contain spending and testing data from all elementary and high school districts in 
Cook County (note that the data does not include Chicago Public Schools and other unit districts).  
For high school students, there appears to be a fairly strong relationship between spending and 
performance on both the PSAE and ACT.  For elementary school students there does appear to be 
a relationship, however the correlation appears to be weaker than for high school students.  Data 
were obtained from the Illinois Interactive Report Card.
265
    
 
                                                        
255 See Myron Orfield, The Region and Taxation: School Finance, Cities, and the Hope for Regional Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 91, 
114 (2007) (citing various studies of reform effects as evidence that funding reform can improve academic achievement); Condron & 
Roscigno, supra note 253, at 20-21; Card & Payne, supra note 253, at 79-80; Susanna Loeb & Marianne E. Page, Examining the Link 
Between Teacher Wages and Student Outcomes: The Importance of Alternative Labor Market Opportunities and Non-Pecuniary 
Variation, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 393, 403, 406 (2000) (examining the impact of higher teacher salaries on student performance). 
256 Card & Payne, supra note 253, at 80 (finding an increase in SAT scores following education funding reforms). 
257 Condron & Roscigno, supra note 253, at 29. The study compared eighty-nine public elementary schools in Ohio’s Columbus 
Public School District. Id. at 23. Despite operating within the same district, total per-student spending ranged from $3,045 to $8,165 
amongst the elementary schools. Id. at 20. The authors attributed this variation to several factors, including political pressure on 
elected school board members to satisfy wealthier residents of the district, variations in grant money to rich and poor schools, 
selection biases in distributing local and state funds, etc. See id. at 21. 
258 Id. at 30. 
259 Id.  
260 See CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 11 (“The big question remaining, however, is whether increased 
investment in instruction generates better academic performance. . . . [T]he answer appears to be a resounding yes.”). 
261 Id.  
262 Id. at 12. 
263 Id. at 11. 
264 Id. at 12. 
265 See ILLINOIS INTERACTIVE REPORT CARD, supra note 8. A spreadsheet containing the data used to create these charts is on file 
with the author. 
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 Increased educational spending can also benefit students beyond mere standardized test 
scores.  A 2012 report by the Brookings Institution found that having a high-performing teacher 
(measured in terms of a teacher’s impact on her students’ test scores) for just one school year can 
increase a student’s net lifetime earnings by $6,400, increase the likelihood a student attends 
college by 1.7%, and reduce the likelihood of teen pregnancy by 1.7%.
266
  As noted earlier in this 
Article, wealthier districts are much more likely to employ teachers with advanced degrees,
267
 and 
may generally be more attractive to more experienced and talented educators.
268
  Similarly, a 
2000 study found that increasing teacher salaries by 10% could ultimately decrease student 
dropout rates by 3-6%.
269
 
B. New Plaintiffs in Education Funding Cases Must Build State-wide Consensus and Political 
Support 
The inherent political sensitivity of school funding issues will require future plaintiffs to 
build political consensus around funding reform before their cases reach the courts.
270
  The 
Kentucky plaintiffs in Rose v. Council for Better Education, generally considered to be the first 
major adequacy claim plaintiff victory before a state supreme court, consciously built public 
awareness and support for funding reform before the case was tried.
271
  This included convening 
education town hall events across the state, meeting with various civic organizations, issuing 
numerous reports, and building support among the state’s business community.272  Publicity 
efforts focused on funding issues facing all schools in the state, and purposefully avoided 
characterizing reform as a redistribution or equalization of school funding wealth.
273
  This 
approach was crucial in minimizing opposition to the litigation from wealthier districts in the 
state.
274
  
                                                        
266 MICHAEL GREENSTONE ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., A DOZEN ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT K-12 EDUCATION 3 (2012), available 
at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/THP_12EdFacts_2.pdf. 
267 See supra text accompanying note 12 (providing data showing that Illinois schools in wealthier districts often have several times 
more teachers with advanced degrees than schools in poorer districts). 
268 See Condron & Roscigno, supra note 253, at 22 (noting that “most highly credentialed teachers . . . are concentrated in high [socio-
economic status], white schools with, arguably, higher per-pupil expenditures” and that “[s]uch schools may be more attractive to 
teachers because of real or perceived differences in quality or more tangible classroom resources that are tied to instructional 
expenditures (e.g. computers, books, and the availablility of teacher’s aids)”). 
269 Loeb & Page, supra note 255, at 403. 
270 See supra text accompanying note 104 (discussing the political volatility of school funding issues in Illinois); Orfield, supra note 
255, at 120-25 (discussing the importance of building political consensus in school funding cases). 
271 See Orfield, supra note 255, at 117, 120-25 (noting that the plaintiffs in Rose actively cultivated support for their case). See 
generally Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (invalidating Kentucky’s public education funding system); 
Litigation—Kentucky, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/ky/lit_ky.php3 (last updated Feb. 2008) 
[hereinafter Litigation—Kentucky] (providing a general overview of Kentucky’s education reform litigation, including the Rose 
decision). 
272 See Orfield, supra note 255, at 120-22 (discussing the various publicity efforts education reformers undertook before and during 
Rose, and noting that “virtually all of Kentucky’s education advocacy groups,” including teacher unions, parent teacher associations, 
and administrator associations, came together to form an education coalition focused on lobbying for finance reform); see also Josh 
Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitution Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2242 (2003) 
(noting that Rose “gave plaintiffs their first education-article-based victory”); Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement 
and Educational Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485 (1999) (providing a detailed account of Rose and education funding in 
Kentucky). 
273 See Orfield, supra note 255, at 122 (referring to this strategy as the “anti-Robin Hood” approach). A common concern amongst 
opponents of education funding reform is that it would substantially reduce funding for the schools that are performing well, because 
these schools tend to be in wealthier neighborhoods. See BURESH, supra note 2, at 102 (noting that a minority of the 1970 education 
committee feared that reforming the funding system would negatively impact schools already achieving high-level academic 
performance); Secter, supra note 2 (noting that Illinois residents have generally disfavored increasing funding for districts outside of 
their own). 
274 See Orfield, supra note 255, at 122 (noting that the “anti-Robin Hood” approach made education funding reform palatable to all 
districts). 
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Similarly, building comparable political consensus in Illinois is important.  State supreme 
court justices may be more influenced by current political trends than their federal 
counterparts.
275
  Unlike federal judges, state supreme court justices in many states, including 
Illinois, are popularly-elected and do not serve life terms (in Illinois, they serve ten year terms).
276
  
State supreme courts also generally play a greater role in setting public policy than federal 
courts.
277
  Furthermore, both Edgar and Lewis E. featured a limited number of district plaintiffs; 
increasing popular support may aid in including a larger, more diverse body of district plaintiffs 
in future litigation, thereby increasing the political pressure on the court to hear the case on the 
merits.
278
  
Should a future challenge prove successful, building political consensus may also 
encourage state lawmakers to work quickly towards a reformed funding system.
279
  In Edgar and 
Lewis E., as well as Rose in Kentucky, plaintiffs have merely sought a declaration that the current 
funding system is unconstitutional.
280
  Following the court’s ruling, the onus for fashioning a new 
funding system shifts to the state legislature, without an explicit framework for a new funding 
system.
281
  As past cases demonstrate, state legislatures are often slow to act on education finance 
reform.
282
  Public demand for reforms in school funding may thus act as a spur to legislative 
inertia and partisan gridlock.
283
 
There is evidence to suggest that a broad base of political support for funding reform 
could be built in Illinois.
284
  The vast majority of Illinois public schools are either “foundational” 
or “alternative” grant schools, meaning that most schools should have some interest is receiving 
greater funding from the state.
285
  Moreover, the failed attempt at reforming Article X of the 
Illinois State Constitution in 1992 received bi-partisan support from urban Democrats and rural 
                                                        
275 See Swenson, supra note 98, at 1152-54 (finding that elected supreme court justices were somewhat more likely to strike-down 
school funding systems). It should be noted, however, that Swenson’s article found that, because even appointed justices often face 
retention elections, the relationship between the method of judicial appointment in a state supreme court and the justices’ likelihood of 
striking-down a state finance system is not entirely clear. Id. 
276 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to appoint “judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of 
the United States,” which includes judges in lower federal courts); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting federal judges lifetime tenure); 
ILL. CONST. art. VI., § 10, 12(a); see also GA. CONST., art. VI, § 7, ¶ 1 (providing for the election of Georgia state supreme court 
judges); MINN. CONST., art. VI, § 7 (providing for the election of Minnesota state supreme court judges); TEX. CONST., art. V, § 2(c) 
(providing for the election of Texas state supreme court judges); WASH. CONST., art. IV, § 3 (providing for the election of Washington 
state supreme court judges); WIS. CONST., art. VII, § 4 (providing for the election of Wisconsin state supreme court judges).  
277 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
278 The Edgar suit was brought by roughly thirty-seven districts (and additional individuals), and in Lewis E. the local district was a 
defendant. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Ill. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Ill. 
1999). In contrast, the body of plaintiffs in Rose initially included a coalition of sixty-six districts, and was later joined by districts 
from five additional counties. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989). 
279 See Orfield, supra note 255, at 120-25 (noting the positive influence Rose and its surrounding reform advocacy efforts had on 
Kentucky’s legislature). 
280 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1180; Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 801-02; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190. 
281 See, e.g., Litigation—Kentucky, supra note 271 (noting that the Kentucky legislature was ultimately responsible for fashioning 
school funding reforms with minimal guidance from the Kentucky Supreme Court). 
282 See supra Part III-C (noting that legislative reform following judicial invalidation of a school funding system can often take several 
years). 
283 See generally Hunter, supra note 272, at 499-516 (discussing reform in Kentucky following Rose); Orfield, supra note 255, at 120-
25 (arguing that advocacy efforts helped spur the Kentucky state legislature to enact meaningful reform following Rose). 
284 See supra Part III-B (noting that there was bipartisan support for the failed 1992 amendment to Article X); CTR. FOR TAX & 
BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11 (discussing how both urban and downstate school districts have a strong interest in 
education funding reform, suggesting that both Chicago-area Democrats and downstate Republicans should be able to reach consensus 
on the issue). 
285 In 2011, approximately 73.1% of Illinois’ public school children were served by foundation level districts, 21.9% of students 
attended alternate formula districts, and just 5.0% of students attended flat grant districts. GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83; see 
also CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 6 (providing a similar breakdown of how many students attend 
each type of district). 
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Republic legislators.
286
  These instances of past statewide support for reform suggest that future 
challenges to current funding system can once again be built.  
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Should Hear Future Funding Litigation on the Merits, and Should 
Find a State Constitutional Guarantee of a Minimally Adequate Education 
Provided that future plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the current Illinois school 
funding system is unconstitutional, the Illinois Supreme Court should not continue to dismiss 
such claims as non-justiciable political questions.
287
  Even if the court applies the federal Baker 
standards for determining when an issue is political—a choice that is itself questionable—
education finance litigation is well within the ambit of the judiciary.
288
  The advent of state and 
nationwide academic standards and increased standardized testing, as well as the structure of 
Illinois’ school funding itself, provides easily comparable statistics with which the court can 
judge the fundamental constitutionality of the funding system.
289
  Moreover, there is nothing in 
the court’s past political question jurisprudence to suggest that it is prohibited from ruling on 
politically sensitive issues so long as it is not, in effect, legislating from the bench.
290
  Simply put, 
education finance cases require the court to do nothing more than its basic function—to judge the 
constitutionality of the law.
291
  
Once past the “political question hurdle” established by Edgar and Lewis E., the court 
should reexamine Article X of the Illinois State Constitution and find that it guarantees some 
minimal level of educational quality.  Although the Edgar court appeared to be correct in its 
determination that Article X does not create a mandate for centralized state funding of the public 
education system, it largely failed to address other salient elements of the clause.
292
  Most 
notably, the court’s refusal to clearly define the meaning of “high-quality,” and instead 
dismissing it under their aforementioned political question analysis, leaves open the potential that 
Article X does in fact guarantee a minimally adequate education for Illinois students.
293
  Records 
from the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention suggest that the use of “high-quality” was meant 
to promise something more than the “good” education promised in the constitution’s original 
education article.
294
  Moreover, comments from delegates following the convention, while not 
legally binding, further suggest that they did intend for Article X to catalyze education-funding 
reform.
295
 
                                                        
286 See supra Part III-B; see also CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 6-7 (discussing generally how the 
state funding system negatively impacts both urban and downstate schools). 
287 See supra Part IV-A (arguing that the Edgar and Lewis E. courts erred in their use of the federal political question doctrine to find 
education funding issues nonjusticiable). 
288 See supra Part IV-A (arguing that past Illinois Supreme Court precedent in political question cases should allow the court to rule on 
education funding cases so long as it does not actively fashion a new funding scheme on its own). 
289 See supra Part IV-A (arguing that the Illinois Supreme Court has had readily-available standards with which it can judge 
educational quality since at least Edgar, and that recent changes in standardized testing have only made such comparisons easier to 
make). 
290 See supra Part IV-A (arguing that the most recent Illinois political question cases allow the court to rule on issues that are 
politically sensitive). 
291 More recent school funding litigation has pressed the court only for a declaration of unconstitutionality, and has specifically 
acknowledged that the court should not formulate its own funding reform measures. See Complaint, supra note 30, at 15; BUS. & 
PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE BPI/SIDLEY SCHOOL FUNDING LAWSUIT 1 
(Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.bpichicago.org/documents/FREQUENTLYASKEDQUESTIONS.3.24TOUSE.pdf. 
Moreover, state supreme courts in other states have similarly emphasized the role of the legislature in reforming funding schemes.  See 
Orfield, supra note 255, at 117 (noting that the Kentucky Supreme Court emphasized in Rose v. Council for Better Education that 
reform is solely the legislature’s duty). 
292 See supra Part IV-B (arguing that the Edgar court failed to adequately determine the meaning of “high-quality” in Article X). 
293 See supra Part IV-B (arguing that the use of “high-quality” in the 1970 Convention redraft of Article X was intended by the 
delegates to increase the minimum level of education adequacy promised by the Illinois State Constitution); RECORD OF 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 767 (providing a transcript of debate regarding the inclusion of “high-quality”). 
294 See supra Part IV-B; RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 767. 
295 See supra Part IV-B (quoting Delegate Malcolm Kamin as stating his belief that the new Article X would lead to meaningful 
education finance reform in Illinois). 
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Lastly, the court should not avoid ruling on future funding cases out of deference for the 
concept of “local control.”296  The current education funding system provides meaningful choice 
only to the wealthiest districts, while poorer districts are politically and economically precluded 
from affecting real funding changes at the local level.
297
  Local control has also ceded to state 
oversight in many other areas, including curriculum planning, personnel decision making, and the 
education of disabled students.
298
  Ultimately, local control is a policy preference, not a statutory 
or constitutional mandate.
299
  The Illinois Supreme Court should not constrain its full authority in 
the face of what may well be an antiquated policy choice for public schools. 
D. The Illinois State Legislature Must Understand that Schools Should Not Be Funded Equally 
While an examination of alternative school funding systems is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it is worth noting that achieving complete equality in school funding may both be 
impossible and unwise.
300
  Education funding schemes that redirect money away from wealthy, 
academically successful school districts to poorer districts would prove highly unpopular.
301
  
Furthermore, schools that are able to spend more on their students tend to perform better,
302
 and it 
does not make sense to pull resources away from well-functioning districts.  Beyond politics, 
however, lies the fact that poor districts in both urban and rural areas may in fact require a greater 
level of funding than suburban schools to properly address issues unique to their student 
populations.  Poorer school districts often serve students requiring more complex services, 
including English as a Second Language instruction, services for students with learning 
disabilities and/or psychiatric disorders, long-distance busing in rural areas, etc.
303
  Effective 
education funding reform in Illinois must therefore account for the unique needs of school 
districts across the state.
304
 
                                                        
296 See supra Part IV-C (arguing that, as a mere policy preference, there are no constitutional or prudential reasons why the Illinois 
Supreme Court must defer to the concept of local). 
297 See supra Part IV-C (arguing that only wealthy districts have the financial resources to experiment with their curriculum, hire more 
highly-educated and talented teachers, etc., whereas poor districts are forced to tax between statutorily-specified minimum and 
maximum rates and generally lack sufficient financial resources to affect change in their schools). 
298 See supra Part IV-C (discussing the various testing and labor laws that have centralized control of Illinois schools in the state over 
the past several years). 
299 See supra Part IV-C (arguing that the Illinois Supreme Court is empowered to rule on the constitutionality of laws such as the 
current funding system, and should not defer to a traditional policy preference). 
300 During the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, two different drafts of Article X that would have substantially equalized per-
pupil funding in all schools were roundly rejected. See BURESH, supra note 2, at 84-86, 114-18 (summarizing the debate over Article 
X Section 1’s final sentence). Furthermore, the amount of money a school requires to adequately fund its students’ education is 
dependent on the needs and circumstances of its student body, including the prevalence of learning disabilities and other health issues. 
See BAKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that schools require different funding levels based on demographic differences in the 
student body). 
301 Take, as an example, the bitter debate over the 1992 Article X amendment proposal, which led to a fistfight between downstate and 
suburban Chicago state representatives. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also BURESH, supra note 2, at 102 (noting that 
a minority of delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention feared education funding reform would redirect funds from wealthy 
districts to poor districts, at the expense of students in wealthier districts). 
302 See supra Part V (discussing the impact of increased per-pupil expenditures and academic performance). 
303 See BAKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (“Student poverty — especially concentrated student poverty — is the most critical variable 
affecting funding levels. Student and school poverty correlates with, and is a proxy for, a multitude of factors that impact upon the 
costs of providing equal education opportunity— most notably, gaps in educational achievement, school district racial composition, 
English language proficiency, and student mobility. State finance systems should deliver greater levels of funding to higher-poverty 
versus lower-poverty settings, while controlling for differences in other cost factors.”). 
304 The funding reforms devised by the Kentucky legislature following the Rose decision might serve as a model.  Briefly, Kentucky’s 
revised funding system created base-level grants for school districts that factor in the number of poor, disabled, and special education 
students present in a district. See LAWRENCE O. PICUS ET AL., KY. DEP’T OF EDUC., ASSESSING THE EQUITY OF KENTUCKY’S SEEK 
FORMULA: A TEN-YEAR ANALYSIS 3-5 (2001), available at http://education.ky.gov/districts/SEEK/Pages/Taxes.aspx (summarizing 
the structure and impact of Kentucky’s education funding reforms). On top of these base grants, the Kentucky system provides 
districts with several optional, property tax-based methods for supplementing revenues, and further provides additional state aid to 
proper-poor districts. See id.; Orfield, supra note 255, at 119 (noting that Kentucky doubled its state aid to public schools following 
the Rose decision, significantly increasing total funding to poor school districts and essentially eliminating the link between local 
property wealth and per-pupil expenditures). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Since the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Rodriguez, plaintiffs have 
taken on inequitable public education finance systems in state courts.  While many cases have 
been successful and resulted in significant reforms in some states, the Illinois Supreme Court 
effectively closed the courthouse door on funding litigation.  Nevertheless, the court’s decisions 
in Edgar and Lewis E. are not impenetrable.  The court’s refusal to judge these cases on the 
merits rests on questionable application of the federal political question doctrine, neglecting to 
consider the unique nature of state supreme courts as well as the Illinois Supreme Court’s own 
political question jurisprudence.  Moreover, the court’s reading of the 1970 Constitutional 
Convention record regarding the drafting of Article X only goes halfway, failing to properly 
consider whether it mandates a minimum level of educational quality for Illinois students.  
Finally, the court shackled its own judicial authority by deferring to the concept of “local 
control,” a mere policy preference rather than a constitutional or even statutory dictate.   
Future challenges to the Illinois education funding system may very well prove 
successful on these points, but it will require a comprehensive effort to build the political will 
necessary for enacting true education reform.  Future plaintiffs should not be deterred by the 
magnitude of such an endeavor.  Political consensus for reform has existed in the past, and it can 
be built again today.
305
  As school budgets continue to be cut, as school buildings continue to 
crumble, and as Illinois’ students continue to fall behind their peers across the nation,306 it will 
become increasingly clear that the state can longer turn its back on one of its most pressing 
problems.  
                                                        
305 See supra Part V-B (discussing the importance of building political consensus around funding reform before commencing 
litigation, and the existence of past political consensus in Illinois). 
306 Illinois has some of the largest “performance gaps”—differences in academic performance between specific demographic groups—
in the nation. In 2011, there was a 33% difference in the number of non-low-income 4th graders and low-income 4th graders who 
could read proficiently, the 5th greatest disparity in the nation. ADVANCE ILL., THE STATE WE’RE IN: A REPORT CARD ON PUBLIC 
EDUCATION IN ILLINOIS 7 (2012), available at http://www.advanceillinois.org/filebin/swi_2012/Adv_Ill_Report_Card-Nov12.pdf. 
There was a 27% difference in the number of white and Latino 4th graders who read proficiently—the 11th worst in the nation—and a 
33% gap between white and black 4th grade readers—the 5th worst in the nation. Id. A comparison of Illinois 8th graders’ math 
proficiency found similar disparities between these demographic groups, with Illinois ranking in the bottom 20 of states in all three 
comparison categories. Id. Illinois also ranked 34th in the nation in high school graduation rates, 41st in worst (greatest) K-12 student 
suspension rate, 41st in the minimum number of K-12 instruction hours per year, and 40th in the number of high school graduates 
attending college. Id. at 21-22, 24. 
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